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Abstract 
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)—recognized as a model public works 
safety-net program—active for over ten years, provides food and cash payments to households 
suffering from food insecurity in return for labor that builds public infrastructure, including the 
rehabilitation of degraded lands. In addition to the target benefits of food security and 
infrastructure development, PSNP’s participatory watershed management interventions deliver 
climate-change mitigation benefits by sequestering carbon in soils and biomass, and reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from the agricultural, forestry and other land use 
(AFOLU) sector. To date, Ethiopia’s PSNP has been primarily funded by development assistance 
from bi- and multi-lateral donors. However, new opportunities from climate finance channels 
could be opened up by quantifying PSNP’s climate-change mitigation impacts (frequently 
referred to as “carbon benefits”).  
This study, conducted within PSNP’s Climate Smart Initiative (CSI), demonstrates that PSNP’s 
participatory watershed management interventions usually deliver net positive carbon benefits 
across varied agro-ecological zones. On average, the 28 CSI sites are expected to deliver a mean 
carbon benefit of 5.7 tonnes of carbon dioxide-equivalent per hectare per year (tCO2e ha-1 yr-1) 
over a 20-year accounting period. These benefits are attributable, in order of importance, to (i) 
above- and below-ground biomass sequestration, (ii) soil organic carbon accumulation, (iii) 
reduced GHG emissions from livestock management, and (iv) abatement of other land-use 
related GHGs. Considering that Ethiopia’s PSNP projects cover hundreds of thousands of 
hectares, this study provides compelling evidence to recommend that methodologies to 
quantify the carbon benefits be embedded in future PSNP 4 and related interventions, to 
facilitate access to climate finance. But, neither compliance nor voluntary carbon-offset 
markets are currently in a state to support ambitious carbon projects on a scale comparable to 
the size of PSNP. However, ongoing negotiations within the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) indicate that a binding international commitment to 
reduce global GHG emissions is likely to be reached in the near future. And it is probable that 
carbon offset markets will be one of the mechanisms available for countries to meet their GHG 
reduction obligations.  
In consideration of the above points, we recommend that Ethiopia act now to that it is well-
positioned to take advantage of anticipated carbon market opportunities as they arise. By 
developing one or more carbon market projects on a scale of tens to at most hundreds of 
thousands of hectares (a scale that is compatible with current market opportunities), PSNP’s in-
country capacity will be greatly enhanced, thus positioning Ethiopia to scale up rapidly as and 
when the carbon finance outlook improves.  
However, it imperative to note that all carbon market projects must meet additionality 
requirements. This has specific implications for PSNP in that a program of work that is already 
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planned and financed would not be eligible for carbon finance. To demonstrate additionality, 
any carbon project established under PSNP will need to demonstrate: 
(i) an increase in the geographic scale,  
(ii) an improvement in implementation, or  
(iii) an increase in the longevity of the project  
that would not be achievable without the provision of the additional support from climate 
finance. It is also important to consider that project development, implementation and 
monitoring costs can be substantial, and PSNP should address this by focusing on large 
contiguous areas and deploying lost-cost and streamlined methods for monitoring, reporting 
and verification (MRV).  
 
To lay the foundation for larger jurisdictional carbon accounting methodologies, necessary for 
cost-effective scaling up, PSNP should pursue development of standardized methods to 
quantify carbon benefits across extensive land areas commensurate with PSNP’s wide 
geographic extent. One such type of initiative already under development independently of 
PSNP is the Oromia Forested Landscape Program (OFLP). OFLP can serve as a proving ground 
for jurisdictional carbon accounting approaches related to reforestation, avoided deforestation 
and degradation (REDD+) in Oromia Regional State. However, for PSNP’s diverse suite of 
climate-smart agricultural practices, Oromia remains too large a scale for jurisdictional 
accounting in the near term, given the current complexities of developing GHG accounting 
methodologies for smallholder agricultural systems. Given that it will be several years before 
OFLP mitigation finance begins to flow even for REDD+ projects, PSNP should work in parallel to 
the OFLP to advance policy objectives of carbon finance support for PSNP in the near-term. A 
proposal should be developed and submitted to PSNP’s development partners to support 
creation of a task team within the Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) unit of the 
Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) for climate finance of PSNP.  
Notwithstanding the anticipated potential of carbon markets to support PSNP, direct income 
from bi- and multi-lateral donors in the form of grants and loans remains the mainstay of 
climate finance opportunities at present. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is an attractive 
emerging multilateral climate fund for Ethiopia’s PSNP public works, being the main vehicle 
through which future mitigation and adaptation funds are expected to flow from developed to 
less-developed nations under the auspices of the UNFCCC. The GCF’s six investment criteria, are 
all well-aligned with the objectives and scope of PSNP. In addition to bi- and multilateral 
climate-focused funds, the potential for demonstrated mitigation benefits of Ethiopia’s PSNP to 
be used in support of negotiations for international development funding should not be 
overlooked. This is known as results-based finance and is increasingly used by international 
donors to justify expenditures for climate change mitigation. 
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Introduction – scope and structure of this report 
This report analyzes and summarizes the current status and potential of novel financing 
mechanisms (through climate-change mitigation markets and funds) to support 
implementation of climate-smart agriculture (CSA) interventions in public works safety net 
programs, by way of example of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)1. The 
report illustrates how quantification of climate benefits generated through CSA can help access 
various international climate financing mechanisms. While Ethiopia’s PSNP serves as a model 
case, the opportunities discussed are applicable to numerous public works safety net programs 
being deployed and expanded throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and beyond. With issues of 
food security, sustainable development and poverty alleviation front and center in global 
negotiations for a new international agreement to address climate change, public works safety 
net programs that embed CSA principles are poised to deliver multiple sought-after outcomes. 
This report will provide policymakers, practitioners, and donors at the international, national 
and sub-national levels with an appreciation of how CSA principles can benefit the design of 
future public works safety net programs and their financing through climate mitigation and 
adaptation funds.  
The report begins with an overview of public works safety net programs, specifically Ethiopia’s 
PSNP, and linkages to food security and CSA. The report then shifts its focus to predicted 
impacts of climate change and opportunities for mitigation, specifically via CSA activities 
implemented in PSNP. Next, the state of global carbon finance is discussed—with a particular 
eye on market-based mechanisms for sustainable land-management activities in the 
agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector. Finally, the report evaluates 
opportunities for climate finance to support sustained implementation as well as scaling-up of 
PSNP activities in Ethiopia—and, by extension, other public works safety net programs that 
promote CSA activities.  
1 Food security and social safety net programs  
In much of the developing world, chronic poverty is an endemic issue facing national 
governments. One of the main implications of chronic poverty is that people have insufficient 
access to food and thus suffer from hunger and micronutrient malnourishment. No more so is 
this the case than in SSA, recently ranked as the most food insecure region of the world 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2014), with around one-third of the population classified as under-
nourished (FAO 2005). Mechanisms to increase food production while ensuring equitable 
distribution are needed to feed a growing global population and reduce food insecurity 
                                                     
1 An executive summary tailored to policymakers and highlighting the key findings and recommendations in this 
comprehensive report is available at Jirka et al. 2015a. 
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(Godfray et al. 2010; Wheeler and Braun 2013), especially in Africa where the population is 
expected to increase four-fold to 4.2 billion by 2100 (Gerland et al. 2014).  
In response to poverty and nutrition challenges, social protection programs that provide poor, 
vulnerable and marginalized members of society with cash or in-kind transfers to reduce 
impacts from economic, environmental or governance shocks have been developed and 
deployed across much of the developing world. Social protection safety net programs2 in 
developing countries are credited with reducing food insecurity (HLPE 2012), for example 
during the 2008 food crisis (FAO 2012). In Africa, safety nets are deployed in at least 22 SSA 
countries (Monchuk 2013) to enable households to maintain food consumption in the face of 
shocks (so-called consumption smoothing) and move people towards economic self-sufficiency. 
Given the increasing need for and interest in advancing objectives targeted by safety nets (for 
example, from the international donor community) there is a high likelihood that such 
programs will expand in the coming decades, especially in SSA.  
1.1 Public works safety net programs  
Numerous instruments exist to achieve food security objectives through safety nets (see HLPE 
2012). One of these, public works programs, is designed with the dual objectives of providing 
temporary employment and building and maintaining infrastructure projects (Subbarao et al. 
2012), and has a long history of implementation as food-for-work programs, for example in 
South Asia. Importantly, the secondary outcomes that public works programs achieve in terms 
of new and enhanced physical infrastructure deliver benefits that create long-term value, 
helping to graduate individuals and communities out of dependency (Subbarao et al. 2012). For 
example, public works in the agriculture sector such as terracing, and soil and water 
conservation can, over time, improve crop yields, delivering additional food to households and 
potential income generating opportunities from sales of surplus harvests. Crucially, public 
works programs can also provide gender empowerment (Subbarao et al. 2012). 
1.2 Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme  
Ethiopia’s PSNP3, active since 2004, is regarded as a flagship example of how a public works 
program can benefit the poor, reduce food insecurity, and build critical infrastructure. Led by 
the Ethiopian central government with contributions from a set of bi- and multilateral donors, it 
is the largest such program in Africa and is embedded in the government strategy for moving 
the country to middle-income status by 2025 based on carbon-neutral growth—the Climate 
Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy.  
PSNP is targeted geographically at the most food insecure areas of the country. On an annual 
basis it reaches over 7 million households, or about 10% of the population. Public works 
                                                     
2 Where recipients are not required to pay-in to the system in order to receive benefits (i.e. they are non-
contributory) these programs are referred to as safety nets (Grosh 2008). 
3 For more information and context on Ethiopia’s PSNP see Solomon et al. 2015. 
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interventions in PSNP focus largely on soil and water conservation measures for the agricultural 
sector (which employs the vast majority of Ethiopia’s population), as well as road and school 
building and irrigation works. In the period 2007 – 9 alone, over 167,000 ha of area enclosures 
and 270,000 km of soil and stone terraces were built or restored (see Figure 1), and 
880,000,000 seedlings were planted to rehabilitate land (Coll-Black and Van Domelen 2012).  
 
Figure 1. Climate smart land use interventions including terraces, soil bunds planted with multi-purpose perennial legumes, cut-
and-carry forage systems, and multi-story agroforestry systems at a PSNP agricultural watershed in Damot Gale Woreda, 
SNNPR, Ethiopia. 
1.2.1 Climate smart agriculture and Ethiopia’s PSNP 
Climate smart agriculture (CSA) is defined as a three-pronged approach to (1) sustainably 
increase agricultural productivity; (2) adapt and build resilience of agricultural systems to the 
impacts of climate change; and (3) reduce greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture (Lipper et 
al. 2014). CSA is gaining rapid traction amongst policymakers and practitioners as an approach 
to address the challenges of climate change, food security and sustainable economic 
development in the developing world. In response to a growing recognition that PSNP’s 
agricultural public works interventions shared many of the key aspects of CSA, the Climate 
Smart Initiative (CSI) was launched within PSNP with the aim of contextualizing the implications 
of climate change into PSNP, both from a mitigation and adaptation perspective. Information 
generated by the CSI has provided valuable quantitative data on the climate change mitigation 
potential of Ethiopia’s PSNP (see Woolf et al. 2015). This backdrop of PSNP as a successful, 
large-scale food security safety net program with a core design principle of embedding climate 
smart interventions into public works serves as a launching point of discussion for the 
remainder of this report.  
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2 Climate change overview 
It is now clear that the Earth’s climate is warming, and that it is doing so in response to changes 
to the atmosphere resulting from human activities. The recent International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) assessment report (AR5) describes the evidence supporting these two claims as 
“unequivocal”—meaning that there is no longer any reasonable doubt. Many of the changes in 
the global climate that have been observed over the last half century are unprecedented over 
the previous millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have both warmed, snow and ice have 
diminished at the poles and in mountain glaciers, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of 
the greenhouse gases that drive this warming have increased. Surface temperature over the 
land and ocean has been successively warmer over each of the last three decades and are now 
higher than any preceding decade since instrumental recording began (Figure 2Error! 
Reference source not found.).  
The  atmospheric  levels  of  the three main greenhouse gases responsible for this warming—
carbon  dioxide,  methane,  and  nitrous  oxide—have all increased  to  concentrations higher 
than at any time over at  least  the  last  800,000  years. Atmospheric CO2 has increased by forty 
percent since pre-industrial times, primarily due to fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) 
emissions and secondly from lost carbon stocks in trees and soils due to land use change and 
land degradation. In 2015, global average CO2 concentrations exceeded 400 parts per million 
for the first time in 2 million years. The ocean has absorbed roughly a third of the carbon 
dioxide emitted by human activity, which has thus-far provided a buffer to the rate at which the 
climate has changed, but also causes ocean acidification which is a major threat to marine 
ecosystems and to the fisheries that depend upon them. 
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Figure 2. (a) Observed global mean combined land and ocean surface temperature anomalies, from 1850 to 2012 from three 
data sets. Top panel: annual mean values. Bottom panel: decadal mean values including the estimate of uncertainty for one 
dataset (black). Anomalies are relative to the mean of 1961−1990. (b) Map of the observed surface temperature change from 
1901 to 2012 derived from temperature trends determined by linear regression from one dataset (orange line in panel a). Trends 
have been calculated where data availability permits a robust estimate (i.e., only for grid boxes with greater than 70% complete 
records and more than 20% data availability in the first and last 10% of the time period). Other areas are white. Grid boxes 
where the trend is significant at the 10% level are indicated by a + sign. For a listing of the datasets and further technical details 
see the Technical Summary Supplementary Material. {Figures 2.19–2.21; Figure TS.2} (Source: IPCC 2013b) 
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If greenhouse gases continue to be emitted, the global climate will undergo further warming 
accompanied by consequential changes in all components of the climate system including 
changing precipitation patterns and (likely) increases in frequency of extreme events such as 
droughts, floods, and storms. Under a continued high emissions scenario, global average 
temperatures will likely (i.e., with a 66% probability) rise by between 2.6°C to 4.8°C by 2100, 
although it could be higher or lower than this. A target rise in global average surface 
temperature of no more than 2° C has been widely advocated as required to maintain the Earth 
system within safe limits (although some researchers and more vulnerable countries also 
advocate for lower targets than this). Keeping warming to below 2° C means that, in total, 
humanity must not emit more than 800 billion tonnes of CO2. Given that historical emissions 
have already reached 550 billion tonnes of CO2, this leaves a maximum of 250 billion tonnes of 
CO2 for total future global emission (roughly 25 years at current emission rates). Meeting these 
targets to limit warming within safe limits will require a concerted and protracted global effort, 
and will require that net global greenhouse gas emissions are near-zero or possibly even 
negative (i.e. net sequestration of carbon) by the end of the 21st century. Achieving this 
depends on those countries with high emissions making drastic and timely cutbacks, but will 
also require developing countries to adopt policies such as Ethiopia’s ambitious and forward-
looking Climate-Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy to ensure that they develop in a 
climate-smart manner that supports growth without high emissions. It is also important to note 
that achieving net zero or negative emissions by the end of this century is unlikely to be 
achievable without drawing down some excess CO2 from the atmosphere (to compensate for 
an overshoot in emissions or to offset residual emissions that are very difficult or costly to 
eliminate). Sequestering carbon in soils and trees is almost certainly the most cost effective 
means to achieve this, making land restoration works such as those conducted by Ethiopia’s 
PSNP a key part of an overall climate-change mitigation strategy. When carbon sequestration 
can be achieved while also improving the food security of communities and building their 
resilience to climate change, a win-win situation is created that is the very definition of being 
At current global emission rates, the world 
will have exceeded its total budget within 25 
years to keep warming below 2°C. 
 
Carbon sequestration in trees and soils will 
be a critical component to achieving climate 
stabilization within safe limits. 
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“climate smart”—mitigating climate change while simultaneously building resilience and 
adaptation. 
2.1 Climate change in Ethiopia 
Land temperatures over Africa are likely to rise more rapidly than the global average, 
particularly in the more arid regions. Climate model projections indicate that in a high global 
emissions (business-as-usual) scenario, 2°C warming could be exceeded by mid-century across 
much of Africa (including Ethiopia), and all of Africa by 2080. Without global mitigation efforts, 
temperature rises across Africa will reach 3 to 6°C by 2100, or 3 to 5°C in all of Ethiopia.  These 
increases would be expected to cause extreme heat stress for people, crops, livestock and 
ecosystems, and to 
increase 
evapotranspiration and the 
frequency of heatwaves 
(Elshamy, Seierstad, and 
Sorteberg 2009). In 
Ethiopia, the highest 
temperature increase will 
be in the North of the 
country (Tigray, Afar, and 
Northern Amhara), regions 
that have historically 
already been the most 
prone to climate-related 
shocks (IPCC 2013). 
Precipitation patterns 
predicted by climate 
models are more uncertain 
and show a wide range of 
results with respect to the 
direction of precipitation 
change (Conway and 
Schipper 2011). This 
Without global mitigation, temperatures in 
Ethiopia will increase by more than 2 °C by 
mid-century, and 3-5 °C by 2100. 
Figure 3. Highly degraded landscapes affected by drought and erosion adjacent to PSNP-
CSI sites in Ethiopia. 
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combination of increased temperatures with unpredictable rainfall patterns makes Ethiopian 
agriculture especially vulnerable to climate change, particularly with 95% of its farmland being 
rainfed (Hagos et al. 2009). The most likely scenario with respect to changes in rainfall in 
Ethiopia under a high emissions scenario is that by 2100 there will be a wetter climate, more 
intense wet seasons, and less severe droughts—although with large regional variations of these 
trends and high uncertainty even about the direction of precipitation change. A general trend 
towards increased rainfall overall is expected because higher temperatures will lead to 
increased evaporation (particularly over the ocean), increasing the water vapor loading of the 
atmosphere.  An increase in precipitation in Ethiopia would represent a reversal of the recent 
historical trend towards decreased precipitation, which was caused by recent cooling in the 
Eastern Equatorial Pacific (a trend that is not expected to persist under a warming scenario).  
2.2 Anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
The ongoing change in the earth’s climate is primarily attributed to the release and 
accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the earth’s atmosphere. These GHGs prevent solar 
radiation from escaping the atmosphere and result in the gradual heating of our planet. The six 
GHGs that contribute to global warming most are, in order of largest to smallest contribution to 
net radiative forcing are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride (F-gases) (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. The main GHGs (left) from manmade sources and the economic sectors (right) emitting them on an annual basis 
(source: Solomon 2007). 
Each of these GHGs are associated with different human activities. The majority of emissions 
are attributed to the burning of fossil fuels for energy. AFOLU is the next largest emitting sector 
after energy, and represents nearly one quarter of total emissions (Smith et al. 2014). Within 
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AFOLU, crop and livestock agriculture are the dominant sources of emissions and their 
contributions continue to rise relative to forests and other land use (Smith et al. 2014). 
Therefore, the importance of addressing emissions related to agriculture cannot be overstated.  
The GHGs associated with AFOLU are dominated by CO2, CH4 and N2O. CO2 is primarily released 
through the burning and decomposition of biomass (wood, crop residues, etc.). CH4 and N2O 
are mainly released via a set of pathways including enteric fermentation, manure management 
activities, nitrification/denitrification of nitrogen from synthetic N-containing fertilizers, organic 
fertilizers and soil conditioners, and nitrogen fixing rhizobia associated with leguminous plants, 
and decomposition of crop residues.  
2.3 Carbon dioxide equivalents 
The impact that GHGs have on radiative forcing varies between gases and over different 
timescales, and is typically approximated by their global warming potential (GWP)—a measure 
of the potency of a GHG in the atmosphere relative to CO2, over a certain time interval, usually 
100 years. Because all GHGs have different GWPs, for ease of comparison emissions are 
typically reported using a shared unit—the carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) which is the 
amount of CO2 that would have the equivalent warming effect over a given time period, usually 
100 years in carbon markets. CO2e are typically expressed on a mass basis i.e., the number of 
tonnes of CO2e that a given project would reduce. One tonne of CO2e (tCO2e) is thus the unit of 
transaction utilized by the majority of carbon markets.  
2.4 AFOLU and climate change mitigation 
In addition to being a major contributor of GHG emissions, the AFOLU sector can also play a 
significant role in mitigating emissions by i) sequestering carbon in vegetation and soils, and ii) 
reducing emissions from GHGs associated with land use and land use change. Climate smart 
sustainable land management practices (as opposed to conventional land management 
practices which contribute to climate change as discussed in Section 2.2) can have an especially 
GHG emissions from the agriculture, forestry 
and other land use (AFOLU) sector are second 
only to the energy sector and represent nearly 
one quarter of total manmade emissions 
annually. The contribution of emissions from 
crop and livestock agriculture continues to rise 
relative to forests and other land use. 
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large impact in SSA which is dominated by smallholder agriculture (Pender et al. 2009). A 
selection of these practices and their GHG benefits are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1. Examples of sustainable land management (SLM) activities and their potential GHG benefits. 
Land use SLM activity GHG benefit 
Croplands Organic fertilizer use Displaces GHG emissions from chemical fertilizers 
Low or no-till systems  Builds soil carbon 
Cover crops Builds soil carbon 
Improved residue 
management 
Reduces GHG emissions from residue 
burning/decomposition 
Grasslands Cut-and-carry forage systems Reduces GHG emissions from grassland degradation 
Silvopasture Sequesters carbon in trees 
Improved pasture 
management 
Builds soil carbon 
Forests Agroforestry systems Sequesters carbon in biomass 
Avoided deforestation Reduces GHG emissions from deforestation and 
degradation 
Livestock Improved manure 
management 
Reduces GHG emissions from manure decomposition 
 
It is important to note that the degree to which these practices deliver net positive (or in some 
cases negative) GHG impacts depends on the unique biophysical, climatic and cultural 
attributes of the locations where they are implemented. Nonetheless, meta-analyses of 
sustainable land-management practices show that they generally increase soil and 
aboveground carbon sequestration and reduce emissions from CO2 (Branca et al. 2013). Box 1 
describes how Ethiopia’s PSNP is delivering quantifiable net carbon benefits through the 
implementation of climate-smart interventions.  
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Box 1. Carbon benefits of climate smart interventions in Ethiopia’s PSNP 
The Climate Smart Initiative (CSI) of Ethiopia’s PSNP is intended to build resilience by embedding 
knowledge and climate-specific planning, to enhance food security and community well-being in a 
changing climate. One core focus area of CSI is measuring the mitigation potential of PSNP-implemented 
climate smart land use interventions. These include area enclosures, cut-and-carry forage systems, 
agroforestry, afforestation/reforestation, rangeland restoration, and integrated soil and water 
conservation practices. The suite of interventions deployed at any given PSNP site is tailored to its 
unique biophysical, climatic and cultural characteristics. CSI consortium partners predicted the 
mitigation potential of PSNP interventions using field measurements and modeling techniques at 28 
sites within six Ethiopian regions. Using IPCC Tier 1 and 2 methodologies, the mean carbon benefit 
across all CSI sites was estimated at 5.7 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1 (Figure 5; see Woolf et al. 2015 for details). 
 
Figure 5. Summary of IPCC Tier 1 assessment carbon benefits by GHG flux category aggregated over 28 modeled sites. Black dots 
indicate median values, and boxes show interquartile range. SOC is soil organic carbon. See Woolf et al. 2015 for details. 
Biomass and soil organic carbon accumulation were the largest sources of GHG fluxes contributing to 
the overall carbon benefit, contributing on average 2.3 and 2.2 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1, respectively, followed by 
reduced emissions of methane from livestock management at 1.3 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1. Contributions from 
other GHG fluxes (primarily attributable to fertilizer management) were negligible due to the low 
frequency of inorganic fertilizer use in Ethiopia. Variability between PSNP sites was substantial (standard 
deviation 6.1 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1) underscoring large differences across the landscape in potential carbon 
benefits. Causes of variability are attributed to i) type of sustainable land management intervention 
(e.g., grassland restoration has lesser impact than woodland reforestation), ii) differences in extent of 
implementation (e.g., types of trees and density of planting, allowance of firewood and timber 
extraction, effectiveness of livestock exclusion), and iii) bioclimatic and edaphic factors (e.g., low rainfall 
areas are less productive, sandy soils store less carbon). Nonetheless, at some sites the net carbon 
benefit exceeded 10 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1. When considering that Ethiopia’s PSNP interventions cover 
hundreds of thousands of hectares, the potential for PSNP to have a meaningful impact on climate 
change mitigation is compelling.  
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3 Market-based mechanisms to incentivize GHG emissions reductions 
Atmospheric GHG concentrations are nearing planetary limits of providing a safe habitable 
planet for humanity (Steffen et al. 2015). The need to slow, and if possible reverse, GHG 
concentrations to avoid the worst effects of climate change is therefore urgent. Some actions 
to achieve this climate-change mitigation can be provided at relatively low cost (such as 
improved energy efficiency, or on-shore wind and hydropower in suitable locations). However, 
achieving more ambitious targets required to keep climate risk within acceptable bounds will 
require that a comprehensive portfolio of measures be implemented that also includes more 
expensive interventions such as avoided deforestation and carbon capture and storage (Enkvist, 
Nauclér, and Rosander 2007).  
Economies across the globe are taking steps to mitigate rising atmospheric GHG levels. On the 
one hand, there are regulations limiting the amounts of GHG emissions that can be emitted by 
certain sectors (e.g., energy, transport) without including provisions for trading emissions 
allowances or purchasing offsets. These types of actions are non-market-based, i.e., they do not 
involve direct financial transactions. On the other hand, there are instruments that put a price 
on GHGs in order to incentivize decarbonization. These are termed market-based mechanisms 
and fall into two categories: carbon taxation, and cap-and-trade systems. At present, there over 
60 carbon pricing schemes (carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems combined) worth about 
US$30 billion4 (Kossoy et al. 2014) that are implemented or being planned as part of regulations 
capping GHG emissions at the sub-national, national or international levels. 
3.1 Carbon taxes 
Carbon taxes guarantee a fixed price on carbon in an economic system (Kossoy et al. 2014). 
They generate revenues that can be used to fund low-carbon technologies and emissions 
reduction activities, and they also incentivize investments in upgrades to facilities or processes 
by emitting entities affected by the carbon tax. Fourteen national governments and one sub-
national government currently have a carbon taxation program in place (Kossoy et al. 2014). 
                                                     
4 Excluding the CDM. Market value is calculated by multiplying the 2013 cap by the allowance price.  
Actions are being taken by economies across 
the globe to mitigate climate change. 
Market-based mechanisms put a price on 
GHGs in order to incentivize decarbonization 
and fall into two categories: carbon taxation, 
and cap-and-trade systems. 
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However, carbon taxes do not directly support mitigation activities through offsetting programs 
and are therefore not currently relevant to Ethiopia’s PSNP.  
3.2 Cap-and-trade systems and carbon markets 
Cap-and-trade systems are a type of market mechanism that place a limit (cap) on annual 
emissions by sector and then allow emitters to buy and sell (trade) excess emissions amongst 
regulated entities. Cap-and-trade systems are also referred to as emissions trading schemes. A 
key tenet of cap-and-trade is that the cap should be lowered annually to ensure that emissions 
fall over time. For example, in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS; created 
to help meet European Union (EU) country obligations under the Kyoto Protocol) the cap on 
emissions in 2020 is projected to be 21% lower than in 2005 (European Commission 2015).  
Some cap-and-trade systems permit allowances (i.e., carbon credits) to be created and sold via 
activities that reduce GHG emissions and/or sequester carbon. Credits are generated by 
projects/activities undertaken by third parties, sometimes outside the regulated jurisdiction 
and in wholly different regions of the globe. Carbon credits (usually quantified as tonnes of 
CO2e) can then be purchased by regulated entities to meet their cap. Such systems are dubbed 
carbon markets. In theory, carbon markets identify the most economically efficient i.e., low 
cost, way to reduce atmospheric GHG concentrations. For example, a power plant in a 
developed country may have to invest the equivalent of US$100/tonne CO2e to install new 
technologies that reduce its emissions to its cap whereas it can purchase carbon credits from a 
reforestation project in a developing country at US$5/tonne CO2e to achieve the same 
reduction.  
While carbon markets work across many scales and have different governance structures and 
transaction frameworks they all enable GHG-emitting entities—whether governments, 
companies or other institutions—to offset their carbon footprint by investing in external 
projects or activities that reduce GHGs or sequester carbon. In carbon markets the GHG-
emitting entity does not directly reduce its own emissions; rather it finances actions that reduce 
GHG emissions or sequester carbon and then applies the reductions against its own carbon 
footprint.  
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3.2.1 Types of carbon markets  
Carbon markets were initially conceived as tools that allow the market to identify the lowest 
possible price to reach GHG emissions targets compelled by regulations. These are termed 
compliance carbon markets—regulated entities must comply or they risk adverse actions by the 
regulator. Compliance carbon markets are developed as mechanisms within treaties or laws 
that obligate GHG-emitting entities to reduce their emissions. 
Compliance carbon markets have only been implemented in certain jurisdictions (see Section 
3.3) and cover a minor portion of total annual GHG emissions. But their utility as mechanisms to 
instigate investments in decarbonization has spawned creation of analogous voluntary carbon 
markets. These enable entities (companies, individuals, or any other GHG emitters) to 
voluntarily offset their carbon footprint.  
Carbon markets that allow international offsetting are relevant to Ethiopia’s PSNP—as well as 
other public works safety net programs—and are discussed further in the following sections.  
3.3 Overview of compliance markets 
At present there are around 20 cap-and-trade systems in force with established rules and 
another 15 under consideration at the regional, national and sub-national scales (Kossoy et al. 
2014). Some—such as the EU-ETS and the six provincial Chinese pilot emission trading 
schemes—encapsulate a significant portion of global carbon emissions. Others, particularly 
those operating in smaller, less industrialized countries, only encompass a small fraction of 
global GHG emissions but are nevertheless important because they create proving grounds for 
novel trading mechanisms and, perhaps more importantly, demonstrate political will to 
confront the global challenge of climate change.  
3.3.1 Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism 
The Kyoto Protocol is by far the largest binding treaty to address global climate change with 191 
signatory countries plus the European Union. It was adopted under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), initiated in 1992. The Kyoto Protocol 
Compliance carbon markets are developed as 
mechanisms within treaties or laws that obligate 
GHG-emitting entities to reduce their emissions. 
At present, there over 30 compliance carbon 
markets at the sub-national, national or 
international levels. Together these markets are 
worth about US$30 billion. 
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required signatories from industrialized (Annex 1) nations to reduce their emissions to pre-1990 
levels during the first commitment period from 2008-12. The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol was signed in December 2012 creating a second commitment period (2013-20).  
While considerably reduced in scope (only 12% of global annual emissions covered as opposed 
to over 50% under the first commitment period), the Doha Amendment maintains momentum 
towards a new binding treaty intended to replace Kyoto and encompass emissions reduction 
goals from the world’s largest emitters, specifically the USA, China and India, by 2020. This 
post-Kyoto treaty is actively being negotiated ahead of the upcoming UNFCCC 21st Conference 
of Parties (COP-21) meeting in Paris, France in December 2015 (see Section 5.3.2).  
To facilitate required emissions reductions under Kyoto, three market-based mechanisms were 
created: 1) Emissions Trading, enabling Annex 1 countries to trade surplus GHG allocations 
amongst themselves, 2) Joint Implementation (JI), enabling Annex 1 countries to invest in GHG 
reducing activities in other Annex 1 countries, and 3) the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). The latter mechanism enables developing (non-Annex 1) countries to create Certified 
Emissions Reduction (CER) credits—one CER is equivalent to one tonne of avoided CO2e—
through the deployment of quantifiable mitigation activities. Annex 1 countries can then 
purchase CERs to meet their emissions reduction requirements. The CDM and its relevance to 
Ethiopia’s PSNP is discussed in detail beginning in Section 5.1. 
3.3.2 Other compliance carbon markets 
In addition to the CDM, there are over 30 regional, national and sub-national compliance 
markets implemented or planned5. The most prominent of these is the EU-ETS, set up to help 
European nations meet their internal commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. It came into 
force in 2005. By volume of emissions covered, it is the by far the largest cap-and-trade 
program. During its second phase (coinciding with the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol 2008-12), the EU-ETS permitted international offsets totaling around 1.4 billion tCO2e 
to be purchased via JI and CDM projects. It rapidly became the largest source of demand for 
CDM CERs and was a driver of the international carbon markets. However, offsets from the 
AFOLU and nuclear energy sectors were explicitly prohibited. The EU-ETS is currently in its third 
phase of implementation (2013-20), coinciding with the Kyoto Protocol second commitment 
period. Prohibitions on international offsets from the AFOLU sector remain in place. 
Nonetheless, the EU is advocating at the UNFCCC level for inclusion of new mechanisms for 
international carbon markets that would cover entire economic sectors and utilize standardized 
methods to assess baselines and additionality (see Section 7.3), as opposed to the project-
based approach used in the CDM and voluntary carbon markets. If incorporated at COP-21, 
such an approach may be very promising to the scale and scope of Ethiopia’s PSNP.  
 
                                                     
5 For a list of implemented and planned compliance markets see Kossoy et al. (2014). 
  
27 
After the EU-ETS, the recently formed California (USA) Cap-and-Trade Program is emerging as a 
major carbon market. California is the 7th largest economy in the world with a gross domestic 
product of US$2.25 trillion; its Cap-and-Trade Program is a significant new addition to the 
compliance market landscape. The program was created under the Global Warming Solutions 
Act (AB32), passed in 2010, which requires California to reduce its emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020. The program covers 85% of California’s GHG emissions and will deliver a 15% reduction 
over the “business-as-usual” (BAU) scenario via a 3% per annum declining cap until 2020. 
Offsets of up to 8% of a facility’s compliance obligation are allowed, and while not currently 
allowed there are provisions for international offsets in the future.  
Numerous other compliance markets have emerged at the regional, national and sub-national 
levels. These include: the New South Wales (Australia) Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme; the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (comprised of nine northeastern US states); the New 
Zealand ETS; and six sub-national markets within China, which, in 2016 plans to launch a 
national carbon market that aims to reduce the amount of carbon per unit of GDP (aka carbon 
intensity) to 45% below 2005 levels by 2020 However, none of the compliance carbon markets 
discussed in this section allow international offsets and are thus not further discussed.  
3.4 Overview of voluntary markets 
Voluntary carbon markets exist outside of regulatory frameworks. They have been created to 
meet the demands of voluntary buyers of carbon credits, mainly from the private sector. The 
top motivations for participation in voluntary carbon markets are to fulfill corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) goals, to meet stakeholder interest, or to show leadership in climate change 
mitigation in an industry.  
Voluntary carbon markets are for the most part operated by independent, third-party 
organizations that have a not-for-profit mission to combat climate change. Similar to 
The EU is advocating at the UNFCCC for inclusion 
of new mechanisms for international carbon 
markets that would cover entire economic 
sectors and utilize standardized methods to 
assess baselines and additionality. If incorporated 
at COP-21, such an approach may be very 
promising to the scale and scope of Ethiopia’s 
PSNP. 
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compliance markets, they require that methodologies for specific GHG reduction pathways be 
validated before being available for use.  
Of the dozen or so voluntary offset programs that are currently operational worldwide, two 
stand out as particularly relevant to PSNP: the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Gold 
Standard. For further information on voluntary carbon market trends see Box 3. 
4 Key elements of carbon offset programs for PSNP 
Carbon markets are supported by institutions—whether public or private, for-profit or non-
profit—that have built programs containing the necessary elements to quantify, register and 
trade carbon credits. While there are numerous different carbon offset programs linked to the 
various active carbon markets as previously discussed, they all share similar elements6 that 
ultimately enable them to verify claims about emissions reductions generated by carbon 
projects. In the following sections, we focus on those elements requiring special attention 
under Ethiopia’s PSNP to successfully develop a carbon project.  
4.1 Carbon standards 
Carbon standards provide the guidelines, specifications and requirements that must be met to 
ensure consistency amongst projects that are accepted under a carbon offset program. 
Standards are developed by, and are part-and-parcel of carbon offset programs. There is 
considerable overlap between the key elements of carbon standards. They contain the 
requirements that GHG accounting methodologies and carbon offsetting projects must meet to 
be approved. They also lay out the process whereby a project moves through the various 
phases of development, review, implementation, and eventual credit issuance. Ultimately, the 
carbon standard to be followed by the project proponent will be the one linked to the carbon 
market that is selected for project development.  
For Ethiopia’s PSNP, an analysis of the most suitable carbon market would include trends in 
terms of prices and volume of carbon credits transacted, methodologies suited to PSNP public 
                                                     
6 The main elements of carbon offset programs and their relevance to PSNP are discussed in detail in the Step-by-
Step Guide to Developing AFOLU Carbon Market Projects. 
Of the dozen or so voluntary offset programs that 
are currently operational worldwide, two stand 
out as particularly relevant to PSNP: the Verified 
Carbon Standard and the Gold Standard 
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works activities, and ease of project development, among others. This report provides some 
recommendations to this effect in Section 5.3.  
4.2 Greenhouse gas accounting methodologies  
In order for carbon markets to operate, GHG sources, sinks and reservoirs (SSRs) must be 
quantified. To this end, scientifically-based GHG accounting methodologies (referred to as 
protocols by some carbon offset programs) are developed. These methodologies document the 
steps to quantify carbon benefits of a given emissions reduction activity or project e.g., 
renewable wind energy, reforestation, etc., and may also be specific to certain regions of the 
world e.g., tropical rainforests. 
Methodologies are reviewed and approved by carbon offset programs and as such must adhere 
to the standards established by that program. Methodologies must pass through a review 
process before being approved for use; the level of rigor and process for the review varies 
depending on the carbon offset program in which it is to be used. Nonetheless, the objective of 
all carbon accounting methodologies is to quantify the GHG benefit associated with the project 
and to provide guidance to project developers when planning and implementing projects.  
Methodologies have been developed and successfully implemented for a wide variety of 
project types that reduce GHG emissions and/or sequester carbon. In the AFOLU sector, forest-
based methodologies fall chiefly into the following categories: afforestation and reforestation 
(A/R); reduced impact logging (RIL); and reduced emissions from deforestation and 
degradation, conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable management of forests, and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks (collectively termed REDD+).  
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Figure 6. A tree nursery at a PSNP-CSI site with seedlings for reforestation and agroforestry activities. 
Agriculture-based methodologies are at present dominated by those that seek reduced 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions from manure and fertilizer use. There are far fewer 
agricultural methodologies that provide crediting mechanisms for agroforestry, cover crops, 
residue management, soil carbon accumulation, and crop switching—the sustainable 
agriculture activities typified by PSNP. Nonetheless, there are several methodologies applicable 
to PSNP that we detail in Section 7.1.  
Following are a subset of the elements and requirements common to all GHG accounting 
methodologies that should be given careful consideration under current and future 
implementation of PSNP public works programs in Ethiopia. 
4.2.1 Geographic boundary 
The use of geospatial data and techniques to delineate the geographic boundary of areas where 
activities are to be implemented is a requisite for all GHG accounting methodologies in the 
AFOLU sector. Ethiopia’s PSNP implementation entails suites of activities distributed across 
thousands of geographically unconnected locations across the country. Individual PSNP 
locations typically cover tens to hundreds of hectares and have minimal climate change 
abatement potential—and thus minimal ability to generate significant revenues via a carbon 
project. Collectively, however, the quantities of tCO2e generated by Ethiopia’s PSNP become 
compelling for project developers and eventual sale of carbon credits.  
The leading carbon offset programs contain mechanisms to group (or bundle) projects so that 
they fall within the overall project boundary. Given the current structure of PSNP activities 
  
31 
ranging over a broad geographic area with non-contiguous boundaries, a grouped project 
approach must be taken with Ethiopia’s PSNP for there to be any chance of positive financial 
returns on a carbon project. The articulation of the geographic boundary—and in particular 
decisions around the grouping of activity areas in a watershed, woreda or region—thus become 
critical for Ethiopia’s PSNP.  
An alternative to the grouped project approach (which has certain limitations discussed in 
Section 7.2), future implementation (i.e., PSNP 4) may consider concentrating activities in a 
larger contiguous area e.g., large watershed, where a grouped project approach may not be 
needed, and costs of carbon project development, monitoring, reporting, and verification could 
be lower than for a dispersed collection of small-scale interventions. 
4.2.2 Project boundary  
All GHG projects aim to have a primary effect which is the intentional reduction of GHG 
emissions or sequestration of carbon through a target set of sources, sinks and reservoirs. For 
example, an agroforestry project accumulating carbon in woody biomass and soils and reducing 
N2O emissions from chemical fertilizers. However, projects also have secondary non-target 
effects associated with implementation of project activities. For example, the agroforestry 
project may emit GHGs through the combustion of fossil fuels to transport seedlings and 
cultivate soils, and through the decomposition of crop residues used as organic fertilizers. All 
primary and secondary effects are delineated via the project boundary which dictates which 
SSRs must be quantified in order to calculate the net GHG benefit of a project.  
4.2.3 Leakage 
In some cases, the carbon project7 may induce additional unintended effects outside the 
project boundary that can increase GHG emissions elsewhere. These effects are known as 
leakage and, if not properly addressed, could lead to reduced, zero or even net negative GHG 
mitigation i.e., increased GHG emissions under the project scenario. All carbon offset programs 
recognize the importance of identifying and mitigating leakage effects prior to project 
implementation, and providing protocols for quantification and mitigation of leakage that must 
be adhered to.  
Leakage is of particular concern in AFOLU projects. It can occur when project interventions 
displace current land use activities. Potential leakage scenarios in AFOLU projects generally fall 
into the following two categories:  
 Activity shifting leakage that occurs when project interventions displace GHG emitting 
activities to areas outside of the geographic boundary. For example, if lands outside the 
geographic boundary are deforested to create new grazing opportunities for livestock 
                                                     
7 We adopt the common convention in this report of using the term “carbon project” to describe an AFOLU project 
to reduce GHG emissions. It should be borne in mind, however, that so-called carbon projects may also target 
other non-CO2 GHGs. 
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displaced by area enclosures (i.e., exclusion from grazing lands), thereby increasing GHG 
emissions from deforestation; 
 Deforestation leakage (a type of activity shifting leakage) that occurs if reduced 
deforestation and degradation (REDD) project activities shift deforestation/degradation 
to other areas; and 
 Market leakage that occurs due to a shift in supply and/or demand (and thus price) of a 
commodity (e.g., firewood, timber, livestock) when project activities reduce the 
production of that commodity. For example, if timber plantations result in a surplus of 
timber thereby reducing timber prices and incentivizing conversion of existing 
plantations to lower biomass land uses.  
Leakage risk must be assessed using established protocols, and where leakage potential is 
identified, mitigation activities must be designed and implemented. One type of leakage of 
particular relevance to PSNP’s AFOLU projects is the potential for livestock to be displaced by 
area enclosures. Livestock leakage impacts of area enclosures could include: i) new (previously 
unused) grazing lands being utilized as pasture by local communities to compensate loss of 
grazing rights in the area enclosure; ii) increased stocking densities on other grazing lands, 
leading to increased degradation pressure outside the project area; iii) a reduction in stock 
numbers in response to lower forage availability without access to the enclosure; iv) an 
increase in stock numbers due to increased forage production through hay and/or agroforestry 
cut-and-carry systems in the area enclosure; or v) increased demand for crop residues as fodder 
reducing their availability for alternative uses such as soil mulches, composting, fuel or 
construction (see Woolf et al. 2015 for more details). 
4.2.4 Business-as-usual and project scenarios 
Net GHG emissions over time are commonly estimated in what are known as scenarios. These 
scenarios are measured relative to the initial state of the system at time zero. In order to 
quantify changes in GHG emissions resulting from a carbon project, it is necessary to estimate 
what the level of emissions would be in the absence of project implementation. This is known 
alternately as the baseline or business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. Under BAU, in the absence of a 
carbon project, the emissions relative to the initial state may remain the same or even worsen, 
for example, due to ongoing land degradation or conversion of forests to agriculture. Activities 
that are designed and implemented under a carbon project, are then evaluated in relation to 
BAU, with the net carbon benefits generated under the project scenario defined as the 
incremental difference between total emissions in the project and BAU scenarios (Figure 7).   
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Figure 7. Diagram depicting the net carbon benefits generated over time in the project scenario. 
It is also possible that, under BAU, GHG emissions might be reduced even without climate 
finance. For example, activities that are already planned under existing government programs, 
or activities that are required to meet existing or planned regulations would form part of the 
baseline or BAU scenario. This is particularly relevant to Ethiopia’s PSNP 4, whose expected and 
already-financed interventions would therefore be considered as falling within the BAU 
scenario. In this instance only additional GHG mitigation activities above-and-beyond what is 
already planned or regulated would qualify as falling within a project scenario for the purposes 
of garnering carbon finance (see Section 4.2.5 on additionality for further discussion of this 
point). 
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Most carbon offset programs specify the steps to be taken when identifying alternative land 
uses under the BAU scenario8. These include an analysis of relevant national and/or sectoral 
policies, historical land use, socio-economic trends, and any regulations or policies mandating 
the implementation of land use practices. Barriers—related to investments, institutions, 
technologies, common practice, and others—that may prevent implementation of alternative 
land uses are then analyzed. The analyses laid out in the BAU scenario identification are 
subsequently used in the determination of additionality (see next Section 4.2.5).  
For Ethiopia’s PSNP as a whole, identifying the BAU scenario may be a complex task. Ethiopia is 
characterized by highly variable agro-ecological zones and cultural and socio-economic 
circumstances, all of which would have to be assessed to identify BAU scenarios if climate 
finance was sought for a PSNP program-wide initiative at the national scale. Therefore, scenario 
identification should focus on either: i) PSNP sites that share similar biophysical and socio-
economic attributes, enabling them to be grouped under the auspices of a single project, or ii) 
on dedicated interventions within PSNP that are designed specifically as carbon finance 
projects.  
4.2.5 Additionality  
A key requirement of all carbon markets is that the GHG project would not have advanced 
without revenues generated from sales of carbon credits. This requirement that project 
implementation is dependent on carbon finance is known as additionality. It may be that 
market conditions were already favorable and the project would thus have been profitable 
without the additional revenues from sales of carbon credits. Or existing/anticipated laws or 
regulations may mandate the implementation of activities in the region where a project is 
                                                     
8 For example, the CDM “Combined tool to identify the baseline scenario and demonstrate additionality in A/R 
CDM project activities” Version 1, or the “Tool for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in VCS 
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) Project Activities, v3.0”. 
For Ethiopia’s PSNP, identifying the business-as-usual 
scenario may be a complex task. Ethiopia is defined by 
highly variable agro-ecological zones and cultural and 
socio-economic circumstances. Scenario identification 
should focus in on those PSNP sites that share similar 
biophysical and socio-economic attributes, enabling 
them to be grouped under the auspices of a single 
project, or on specific interventions within PSNP that are 
designed specifically as carbon finance projects. 
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intended. Irrespective of the reason, if projects are viable in the absence of income from carbon 
markets, any mitigation of atmospheric GHG concentrations they achieve cannot be considered 
additional i.e., the project would have been implemented regardless of carbon market 
activities.  
The steps to demonstrate additionality build on those used to identify the BAU scenario (see 
previous Section 4.2.4). Once the BAU scenario is identified, an investment analysis is 
conducted. There are various options for investment analyses, ranging from simple to complex. 
Independent of the method selected, however, the analysis should demonstrate that the 
project scenario is not more financially attractive than BAU, i.e., it is additional. Projects that 
cannot satisfactorily demonstrate additionality will not be eligible for acceptance in a carbon 
market. A more detailed analysis of how additionality applies for carbon projects developed in 
the context of Ethiopia’s PSNP is given in Section 8. 
4.2.6 Non-permanence and risk quantification 
Carbon projects accrue climate change mitigation benefits over some time frame. For AFOLU 
projects, the benefits typically accrue gradually as trees grow, soil carbon is replenished, and/or 
AFOLU emissions are reduced inter-annually. Regardless of how GHG benefits were created, 
they are all potentially reversible if technologies fail, forests burn, there is a return to BAU 
management practices, or other unforeseen events occur.  
While projects in all GHG sectors face some risk of reversals, AFOLU projects have inherently 
higher risks and are subject to due diligence requirements above and beyond non-AFOLU 
projects. These include natural risks (e.g., fires, floods, droughts), internal risks (e.g., financial 
viability, project management), and external risks (e.g., land ownership issues, illegal 
encroachment, community relations). Events in all of these risk categories can quickly nullify 
carbon offsets created by the project and are collectively termed non-permanence risks.  
Most carbon markets require the quantification of non-permanence risks when developing a 
project through the use of tools spelled out in the carbon offset program. In the VCS, a risk 
buffer pool of carbon credits that are not tradable is mandated in case of project reversals; the 
higher the degree of risk as determined by the tool the larger a percentage of the total 
anticipated tonnes of CO2e must be kept in the buffer pool. In the CDM, non-permanence risk is 
A key requirement of all carbon markets is that the GHG 
project would not have advanced without revenues 
generated from sales of carbon credits. This requirement 
that project implementation is dependent on carbon 
finance is known as additionality.  
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addressed by requiring that carbon credits expire over a defined time frame (at the end of the 
commitment or crediting period in which they were issued) and are subsequently replaced by 
other credits.  
Climate finance projects under PSNP would be required to quantify the non-permanence risk of 
their activities. As with identifying the BAU scenario and demonstrating additionality, the 
quantification of non-permanence risk for the whole of PSNP would be a complex task given the 
heterogeneity of activities and situations in which PSNP operates. The costs and complexities of 
such an endeavor might be best managed by concentrating efforts on geographically clustered 
interventions within PSNP rather than on the whole of PSNP, at least until carbon markets 
become sufficiently mature to justify a national-scale carbon project. Available tools will help 
guide project developers through the process.9 
5 Carbon market trends in the AFOLU sector  
Carbon markets support a wide range of GHG emissions reduction projects, only some of which 
are in the AFOLU sector. In the CDM, AFOLU projects only make up a tiny fraction of the market 
share of traded CERs (3% of CERs in 2007-11). Instead, the vast majority of CERs generated in 
the CDM to date have been from renewable energy, demand- and supply-side energy 
efficiency, and hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) destruction projects. In contrast, most voluntary 
carbon offset programs trade in a large volume of credits generated through the AFOLU sector. 
For example, AFOLU projects made up the largest GHG sector by volume of tonnes of CO2e 
under the VCS in 2013, largely due to the emergence of numerous large-scale REDD+ projects 
(Figure 9). This discrepancy in AFOLU project representation between the CDM and voluntary 
markets—and its relevancy to Ethiopia’s PSNP—is discussed in the following sections.  
5.1 CDM and AFOLU 
The reasons that AFOLU projects are under-represented in the CDM are varied. The CDM has 
evolved into a complex system requiring large amounts of paperwork, and with numerous 
administrative and governance requirements. This complexity has been shown to contribute to 
                                                     
9 For example, the VCS “AFOLU Non-Permanence Risk Tool, v3.2”. 
While projects in all GHG sectors face some 
risk of reversals AFOLU projects have 
inherently higher risks and are subject to 
due diligence requirements above and 
beyond non-AFOLU projects. 
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low submissions and approvals of CDM projects, especially for A/R projects (Thomas et al. 
2010). It also leads to substantial (and often prohibitive) project development and transaction 
costs, representing a financial barrier to AFOLU projects located in the developing world. 
Further, the technical expertise needed to quantify emissions reductions and carbon 
sequestration in AFOLU (relative to other sectors like energy or HFCs) is an obstacle. These 
above-referenced barriers in the CDM are all applicable to Ethiopia’s PSNP. Multiple processes 
separated in space and time lead to emissions and removals. Establishing causal factors, 
whether anthropogenic or natural, can be difficult and costly, and requires the participation 
and financing of technical experts. 
High project development constraints in the CDM are reflected in the low numbers of CERs 
generated by the AFOLU sector; by 2020, the accumulated CERs attributable to AFOLU are 
expected to total about 3%, most of which will come from methane avoidance in manure 
projects (Figure 8).  
The vast majority (97%) of Certified Emissions 
Reductions generated in the CDM to date have 
been from other sectors, not from AFOLU. In 
contrast, most voluntary carbon offset 
programs—while smaller than the CDM in 
terms of overall volumes traded—target a large 
percentage of their funds to AFOLU projects. 
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Figure 8. Percent of CERs expected until 2020 from CDM projects by sector (source: UNEP DTU Partnership 2015). 
Proponents of the CDM have long recognized these constraints to AFOLU project participation, 
particularly in developing countries such as Ethiopia. Revisions have been made to attempt to 
redress the situation. Most notably, the more recently created Program of Activities (PoA) 
approach—permitting the bundling of numerous project activities under one administrative 
umbrella to reduce cost burdens—has led to an uptick in developing country projects, though 
not necessarily in the AFOLU sector (see Section 7.2 for further information on PoA).  
5.2 Voluntary carbon markets and AFOLU 
Voluntary carbon markets only trade a small fraction (<1%) of the volume of compliance 
markets but they are nonetheless important in several key ways. First, they serve as testing 
grounds for new methodologies, tools, and technologies that would otherwise not meet the 
regulatory requirements of the CDM or other compliance markets. Novel approaches to 
tackling climate change can thus be explored with the additional support of revenues from 
carbon credits. Second, they have a high representation of methodologies for the AFOLU sector 
and serve as important sources of finance for sustainable land management; whereas less than 
1% of CERs on the CDM were comprised of A/R projects (and even fewer in other AFOLU 
categories) in 2013, roughly half of the voluntary market share was comprised of AFOLU 
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projects (Figure 9). A large portion of this market share was attributable to an influx of REDD+ 
carbon credits.  
 
Figure 9. Percent market share by GHG sector and sub-sector in the voluntary market in 2013 (source: Peters-Stanley and 
Gonzalez 2014). 
Given their flexibility and demonstrated interest from buyers, voluntary carbon offset markets 
are anticipated to continue to be an important avenue for development of carbon projects and 
novel methodological approaches in the AFOLU sector into the future. Interventions targeted at 
voluntary markets through Ethiopia’s PSNP may be good candidates for project development, 
but only at a targeted sub-national or local scale given the smaller volumes of transactions in 
voluntary markets.  
5.3 Carbon markets trends and outlook 
Uncertainty in the international regulatory environment under the UNFCCC process over the 
last several years has driven creation of domestic market-based policies designed to take action 
on climate change. At present, there are about 40 national and 20 sub-national jurisdictions 
across the globe that are putting a price on carbon, whether in the form of emission trading, 
carbon taxation or some blended approach (Figure 10). And there are numerous other 
jurisdictions that are in the planning or implementation stages of carbon pricing instruments, 
including in major GHG emitting countries such as China. 
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Figure 10. Map of existing and planned regional, national and sub-national carbon pricing instruments. The circles represent 
subnational jurisdictions. The circles are not representative of the size of the carbon pricing instrument, but show the 
subnational regions (large circles) and cities (small circles) (source: Kossoy et al. 2015). 
But the political and technical landscape that underpins carbon markets and their success is 
highly dynamic and, as a result, future projections are difficult to make. As seen in the global 
economic recession from which certain regions are still emerging, carbon markets are tightly 
enmeshed with the prosperity of both public and private sector actors. 
A new binding treaty emerging from COP-21 in Paris that caps emissions and/or sets a price on 
carbon would send a clear signal to carbon project developers that a robust carbon market can 
be anticipated. Ethiopian policymakers and PSNP managers should be cognizant of 
developments in the rapidly evolving UNFCCC process to make informed decisions regarding 
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allocation of resources for eventual carbon project development within PSNP (see Section 
5.3.2). 
5.3.1 Geographic distribution of CDM projects 
Because of the technical and administrative complexities inherent to the CDM discussed above 
(see Section 5.1), least developed countries have only managed to develop relatively few CDM 
offset projects. For example, Ethiopia only has two approved CDM projects as of 2015, one of 
which is in the AFOLU sector10. Instead, CDM projects are overwhelmingly located in larger, 
industrializing nations, particularly China and India, and to a lesser extent Brazil and Mexico; 
these four countries are host to over 76% of all CDM projects registered or in the pipeline as of 
early 2015 (UNEP DTU Partnership 2015). As a result over 80% of CDM projects are located in 
the Asia-Pacific region. Box 2 explores historical trends in the CDM in detail.  
  
                                                     
10 The Humbo Ethiopia Assisted Natural Regeneration Project. 
A new binding treaty emerging from COP-21 in 
Paris that caps emissions and/or sets a price on 
carbon would send a clear message that a 
robust carbon market can be anticipated. As 
such, PSNP 4 managers should be cognizant of 
developments with respect to the UNFCCC 
process. 
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Box 2. Historical trends in the CDM 
 
The first projects in the CDM 
were initiated in the early 
2000’s. However, significant 
quantities of CERs were not 
generated by those projects 
until 2006, in anticipation of 
the Kyoto Protocol first 
commitment period (CP1) 
which extended from 2008 – 
12 (Figure 11). The price for 
CERS peaked in 2008 and then 
dropped slightly, remaining 
relatively stable at a price of 
about US$12 for several years 
(Figure 12). However, the 
price for CERs began to 
plummet in mid-2011. This 
situation is attributed to a 
combination of low or non-
existent demand and surplus 
supply. The 2008 global 
economic recession, and the 
subsequent European debt 
crisis, led to a substantial contraction in international trade and industrial output. As a result, GHG 
emissions were significantly lower than anticipated across most emitting sectors including industry, 
transport, and energy production. Accordingly, many regulated entities in Annex 1 countries, 
particularly within the European Union, began to meet their targets under the Kyoto Protocol CP1. At 
the same time, there was a large spike (i.e., oversupply) in CDM projects coming online thus flooding 
the market with CERs. Since 2012 there has been relatively little market activity in the CDM with 
prices remaining at less than US$1 per CER. Nonetheless, estimates are that US$28 billion was 
transacted during CP1 for CER purchases, and that US$130 billion was invested in CDM projects.  
 
Figure 11. CDM projects by region and expected CERs generated by those projects from 
2005 – 2015 (source: UNEP DTU Partnership 2015). 
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While a second commitment period (CP2) has been created (the so-called Doha Amendment) 
spanning 2013 – 20, just 27 countries have ratified the Amendment as of April 2015, and only a 
handful of those are Annex 1 countries. Per the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol, 144 countries 
must ratify the Amendment before the second commitment period can enter into force. The 
prospects for continuation of mandatory GHG reductions and demand for CDM CERs under the Kyoto 
Protocol and Doha Amendment are thus dim. 
 
5.3.2 International climate negotiations and prospects for future carbon markets 
Whether the CDM market—or some iteration of an international carbon offset trading 
mechanism—is revived hinges on outcomes from the COP-21 in Paris, France in December 
2015. During that meeting, a new post-Kyoto international agreement to reduce GHG emissions 
is anticipated. Leading up to the Paris talks, countries have agreed to publically disclose what 
actions they plan to take to reduce their GHG emissions post-2020. These disclosures, known as 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), offer insights into the levels of GHG 
reduction targets and whether offsets may play a role. With highly ambitious in-country targets, 
developed countries may seek inclusion of carbon trading mechanisms in a Paris agreement in 
order to reduce costs associated with reducing emissions.  
But there are also detractors of the carbon trading approach. Some argue that by allowing 
offsets, sources of GHG emissions continue to emit business-as-usual rather than doing their 
share to cut emissions. They also argue that carbon trading benefits only a small number of 
host countries and does little to address the most vulnerable; for example, as of February 2015, 
China and India alone comprised over 70% of all registered CDM projects. While the CDM was 
originally intended to benefit the least developed countries, it has mostly benefited countries 
that are in a phase of industrialization.  
Notwithstanding these objections from certain sectors, recent indications from negotiations 
leading up to COP-21 are promising vis a vis both a binding agreement as well as inclusion of 
market mechanisms. Specifically, the Director of the Sustainable Development Mechanisms 
Figure 12. Historical price of CDM CERs (orange line) and European Union Emission Allowances (EUAs; blue line). Note that CERs 
closely track the price of EUAs (source: Schoenberg and Weekes 2015). 
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Programme at the UNFCCC recently stated that “…the question has gone past whether markets 
have a role to play. The question is now how big a role they will play, and how we can make the 
very best use of markets” (UNFCCC Secretariat 2015). This is the strongest sign yet that 
negotiators are in agreement that markets will be a part of a Paris treaty. Essential elements of 
an eventual carbon market mechanism will include: avoidance of double counting; linking 
existing regional, national, and sub-national markets under a common accounting framework; 
ensuring that projects contribute to net mitigation and sustainable development goals within 
the host country; and earmarking a share of proceeds from carbon markets for adaptation 
activities.  
5.3.3 Other compliance markets and potential for PSNP 
As stated in Section 3.3, there is no realistic potential for other compliance markets to play a 
role in supporting mitigation actions in Ethiopia in the near- to mid-term. For this reason, 
advocating for a strong climate treaty under the UN framework is the most promising avenue 
for a compliance market in which Ethiopia, and indeed other SSA nations, can participate.  
5.3.4 Voluntary carbon markets outlook 
Voluntary offsetting is more prevalent in regions covered by regulations governing GHG 
emissions (Goldstein 2015). Fully two-thirds of voluntary offset buyers in 2013 were companies 
located in the EU—already covered by strict compliance obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. A 
handful of major corporations in Japan—covered by several sub-national carbon pricing 
schemes—were also major voluntary offset buyers. Apparently, there are synergistic effects 
between compliance and voluntary markets where awareness built through regulations helps 
grow interest and participation, in some cases above and beyond regulatory requirements 
(Kossoy et al. 2014).  
In parallel with this growing number of compliance carbon pricing programs covering an 
expanding portion of annual global GHG emissions, awareness of and participation in voluntary 
offsetting is also expected to grow (Kossoy et al. 2014). There is an established pattern of 
companies and GHG-emitting entities pre-emptively putting measures in place to reduce their 
carbon footprints—including through participation in voluntary carbon offset markets—ahead 
of planned regulations to reduce GHG emissions. A survey of carbon credit suppliers in the 
voluntary markets showed that by 2020 they anticipated that carbon markets would grow to 
300 million tonnes of CO2e by 2020 (per year), representing around US$1.8 billion annually11 in 
market value (Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez 2014). Box 3 explores historical trends in voluntary 
carbon markets.  
  
                                                     
11 Based on historical market value of US$5.9/tonne CO2e. 
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Box 3. Trends in voluntary carbon markets 
 
Whereas the CDM has 
been in a slump since 
supply of carbon credits 
outstripped demand 
beginning in late 2011, 
the trend in voluntary 
markets has been more 
even-keeled. There was a 
slight downward trend in 
terms of volume of 
traded GHG reductions in 
2013 but that rebounded 
slightly in 2014 (Figure 
13). 
 
The average price per 
tonne of CO2e in 2014 was 
nearly US$4—a full order of 
magnitude higher than CDM CERs. When viewed by sector, AFOLU carbon projects received the 
highest price per tonne of CO2e (Table 2). In fact, grassland management, improved forest 
management, afforestation/reforestation, and agroforestry were the top four in terms of prices 
garnered per offset credit. However, cumulatively only 5.6 million tCO2e were traded in those 
categories 
compared to 
REDD+ alone 
(also within 
the AFOLU 
sector) which 
traded over 26 
million tCO2e 
while only 
receiving a 
price of 
US$4.3 per 
tonne of CO2e. 
Clean cookstoves, energy efficiency, landfill methane and wind—all in the energy sector—rounded 
out the main categories of project type in 2014. 
 
The Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) is by far the largest voluntary offset program in terms of volume 
of carbon credits traded, with over 50% of market share; in 2014 this represented around 33 million 
tCO2e in market volume (Figure 14). VCS has published numerous methodologies including those for 
the AFOLU sector, and has two new programs relevant to PSNP: one allows for additionality and 
baselines to be addressed on a landscape-scale, and another allows governments to access REDD 
finance on a sub-national or even national scale (see Section 7 for detail).  
 
Table 2. Average prices, volumes traded, and market value of carbon credits transacted in the voluntary 
market in 2014 by project type (source Hamrick and Goldstein 2015). 
Figure 13. Tonnes of CO2e generated by projects in the voluntary market sector from 
2005 – 2014 (source: Hamrick and Goldstein 2015). 
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Internal or proprietary 
standards (which offer little 
opportunity to review 
practices, methodologies 
and other important aspects 
of standards) were the 
second most commonly 
deployed standard followed 
by The Gold Standard. The 
latter has AFOLU sector 
methodologies that are not 
as well-developed as VCS’s, 
but in general it is attractive 
to offset buyers located in 
the EU. The other voluntary 
offset programs combined 
captured only a small 
percentage of market share 
and also focus most of their 
efforts on developed country 
trading.  
 
 
6 Marketing the social and environmental benefits of carbon projects 
Carbon markets solely transact in volumes of GHG reductions i.e., carbon credits. Yet, there are 
many potential co-benefits generated by carbon projects not reflected in the tonnes of CO2e 
transacted. Namely, the additional social and environmental aspects that a project can deliver 
to the community and region where it is implemented. This is especially true for AFOLU projects 
which often operate in a community-based context in developing countries.  
The types of co-benefits potentially generated by AFOLU carbon projects are numerous. In the 
environmental realm these include biodiversity conservation, soil fertility, erosion control, and 
water management, and in the social realm improved health, increased agricultural yields, 
increased incomes, climate change adaptation, access to new opportunities for women and 
youths, and intangibles such as well-being and happiness. For example, an agroforestry project 
developed via a farmer cooperative could generate carbon credits for carbon sequestered in 
woody biomass and soils (the carbon component of the project), and simultaneously increase 
habitat for endangered species (environmental component) and improve farmer’s incomes 
through new farm product streams and health outcomes through diversified sources of 
nutrition (social component). Such a project would likely be highly valued by voluntary markets 
for its ancillary social and environmental benefits, and therefore possibly receive a higher price 
for its carbon credits.  
Figure 14. Project standards utilized and % market share in 2014 (source Hamrick and 
Goldstein 2015). 
  
47 
Ethiopia’s PSNP—explicitly designed to create multiple community and environmental goods, 
many of them listed in the paragraph above—is well-placed to take advantage of market 
interest in carbon projects delivering co-benefits. Identifying mechanisms to monetize 
additional benefits is key to garnering a premium in the marketplace, and is discussed in 
Section 6.3.  
6.1 Quantifying co-benefits in the CDM 
Whereas voluntary markets have been quick to develop and adopt mechanisms to market co-
benefits of carbon projects, the CDM has been behind the curve. To remediate this the CDM 
Sustainable Development Co-Benefits Tool12 was launched in 2012, enabling approved CDM 
projects to describe how their activities are creating co-benefits that contribute to the 
sustainable development within the host country. The tool is wholly voluntary. In contrast to 
some voluntary programs described in the following section, it does not allow for quantification 
and marketing of co-benefits.  
                                                     
12 The CDM Sustainable Development Co-Benefits Tool is accessible at http://cdmcobenefits.unfccc.int/Pages/SD-
Tool.aspx.  
Social and environmental co-benefits are 
generated by AFOLU carbon projects in the 
community and region where they are 
implemented. Market analyses show that 
“gourmet” carbon projects with stacked 
benefits receive a price premium in voluntary 
carbon markets. Ethiopia’s PSNP is well-placed 
to take advantage of market interest in carbon 
projects delivering co-benefits.  
  
48 
 
Figure 15. Examples of social and environmental co-benefits generated by carbon projects include clean water provisioning (top 
left), diversified agricultural production (top right), and ecotourism (bottom). Photo credit: Jiro Ose, Concern Worldwide (top 
left). 
6.2 Quantifying co-benefits in voluntary markets 
Market analyses show that “gourmet” carbon projects with stacked benefits receive a price 
premium in voluntary carbon markets. In the European voluntary market in 2013, for instance, 
buyers preferentially sourced carbon credits from projects with social and environmental co-
benefits (Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez 2014). And this trend has been shown to generally hold 
true over the years (Kossoy et al. 2014). 
While the voluntary markets transaction volumes are small relative to the scope of PSNP, this 
demonstrated interest in supporting projects that have ancillary community and environmental 
upsides potentially represents a disproportionately larger opportunity for PSNP than market 
size might suggest. Deciding on one or more co-benefits e.g., household income, health, 
educational attainment, or biodiversity, and developing the tools to monitor them as part of 
PSNP 4 activities could help to access future carbon payments, in the voluntary or compliance 
markets, and to improve marketability of CER’s and prices attainable for them. Box 4 presents 
data quantifying one aspect of these co-benefits (soil fertility) using data generated in 
Ethiopia’s PSNP-CSI.  
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Box 4. Soil fertility co-benefits of Ethiopia’s PSNP 
As with AFOLU carbon projects, public works safety net programs seek to create ancillary 
environmental, social and economic co-benefits. For PSNP, one of the top targets is to enhance food 
security and livelihoods. One way that this is achieved is through building public works infrastructure for 
soil-and-water conservation that increases soil fertility and thus agricultural productivity. Soil samples 
were collected up to 1 m depth from PSNP-CSI sites and key soil parameters were compared to nearby 
degraded soils without any interventions (see Solomon et al. 2015b for details). Figure 16 below 
demonstrates the statistically significant improvement in key soil fertility indicators at PSNP sites under 
cropping and woodland land uses.  
 
Figure 16. Soil available phosphorous and total nitrogen (left graph) and soil organic carbon and cation exchange capacity (right 
graph) to 1-m depth in degraded vs. improved cropland and woodland land uses at 12 PSNP-CSI sites. See Solomon et al. 2015b 
for more details. 
Nitrogen and phosphorous—two critical macronutrients—more than doubled, as did carbon. Increasing 
soil carbon not only draws down atmospheric carbon dioxide but also enhances soil fertility. Soil carbon 
is comprised largely of soil organic matter which confers numerous positive effects on soil health such as 
soil structure, water retention, buffering capacity, and nutrient retention. The latter is measured by the 
cation exchange capacity (CEC)—the ability of soils to retain and exchange nutrients present as cations 
such as calcium, potassium and magnesium. CEC also increased significantly at PSNP sites.  
These data support the conclusion that Ethiopia’s PSNP public works interventions provide key 
ecosystem services and benefits including soil fertility and productivity as well as climate regulating 
benefits. Future focus should be placed on quantifying other PSNP benefits such as crop yields and 
productivity, farmer income and food security parameters as a function of the increased soil health at 
PSNP sites. 
6.3 Methodologies to quantify co-benefits 
Several organizations have developed methodologies to quantify carbon project co-benefits. 
The top two programs, as measured by market penetration, are the Climate, Community and 
Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) Standard, managed by VCS, and Social Carbon. In 2014, over 75% of 
offsets transacted under VCS also qualified for the CCBA Standards. In Ethiopia, there are at 
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least three AFOLU carbon projects under development or already approved that have 
combined their carbon project validation with the CCBA. PSNP 4 project developers should 
review CCBA requirements to assess options for quantifying the many social and environmental 
benefits that PSNP brings to communities across Ethiopia.  
7 PSNP and carbon markets 
PSNP is a large-scale program that bundles multiple sustainable land management activities—
each with its own quantifiable GHG impact—across food insecure regions of Ethiopia. The 
ambitious national scale of PSNP has already demonstrated numerous widespread benefits for 
communities and the environment, not least of which is climate change mitigation. But this very 
breadth of the program represents a hurdle in accessing AFOLU carbon markets which, to date, 
have focused somewhat myopically on project-based activities at scales many times smaller 
than PSNP.  
Nonetheless, published GHG accounting methodologies exist that are applicable to PSNP 
activities. These could be used to quantify carbon benefits and develop carbon projects on a 
case-by-case basis i.e., at the sub-watershed or kebele level, potentially accessing new revenue 
streams for PSNP. Perhaps more promising, however, are recent advances in carbon markets 
that 1) allow the grouping (aka bundling) of projects and 2) the development of “standardized 
methods” to determine the baseline scenario and demonstrate additionality across entire 
sectors such as AFOLU within a specified jurisdiction. This latter approach, in particular, is of 
great interest because it may allow for PSNP activities to be developed into a carbon project 
across, for example, an entire woreda, zone or regional state within Ethiopia, thereby matching 
the broad scale of the initiative and potentially accessing much higher levels of carbon finance 
The ambitious national scale of PSNP has already 
demonstrated widespread benefits for 
communities and the environment, not least of 
which is climate change mitigation. But this very 
breadth represents a hurdle in accessing AFOLU 
carbon markets which, to date, have focused on 
project-based activities at scales many times 
smaller than PSNP. Recent advances in carbon 
markets, however, may allow for PSNP activities 
to be developed into a carbon project across an 
entire regional state within Ethiopia. 
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compared to projects at the watershed level. All of these opportunities are discussed in the 
following sections.  
 
Figure 17. Topographic map of Ethiopia, depicting soil organic carbon (SOC) stocks at PSNP-CSI sites under project (red bars) and 
business-as-usual (light blue bars) scenarios. Note that up to three times more SOC is stored under project scenarios. See 
Solomon et al. 2015b for details. 
7.1 Published greenhouse gas accounting methodologies applicable to PSNP 
To date, GHG accounting methodologies approved by carbon offset programs have been 
tailored for scales suited to individual projects, typically hundreds to thousands of hectares. 
This is due to several reasons. First, is the afore-mentioned complexity of quantifying GHG 
emissions under baseline, BAU, and project scenarios, and measuring factors like additionality, 
leakage, and permanence; this is especially true for the AFOLU sector with multiple pathways 
for and synergies between GHG SSRs. Second, is the inherent risk associated with carbon 
offsetting—again in particular for the AFOLU sector—which could lead to reversals of any 
carbon benefits (see Section 4.2.6). As a result, carbon markets have conservatively restricted 
methodologies to smaller scales where confidence is higher in accurately assessing GHG 
reductions—and mitigating any risks—associated with project implementation.  
Despite this mismatch in terms of scale, there are numerous approved methodologies that are 
germane to the types of sustainable land management activities implemented under Ethiopia’s 
PSNP.13 In the AFOLU sector, forest-based methodologies for activities including A/R, RIL, and 
REDD+ could all address certain components of PSNP. Agriculture-based approved 
methodologies are at present dominated by those that seek reduced methane and nitrous 
oxide emissions from manure and fertilizer use. There are far fewer approved agricultural 
methodologies that provide crediting mechanisms for agroforestry, cover crops, residue 
management, soil carbon accumulation, and crop switching (the sustainable agriculture 
                                                     
13 A detailed spreadsheet listing published AFOLU methodologies and their relevance to Ethiopia’s PSNP is 
available in the Step-by-Step Guide to Developing AFOLU Carbon Market Projects. 
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activities typified by Ethiopia’s PSNP) though crucially a few do exist and have been successfully 
used to develop carbon projects that share characteristics with PSNP14. Box 5 explores the 
theoretical potential for Ethiopia’s PSNP to generate revenues via AFOLU carbon projects. 
  
                                                     
14 For example, the Kenya Sustainable Agriculture Land Management Project using VCS Methodology VM0017 
Sustainable Agricultural Land Management. More information on the project is accessible at 
http://wbcarbonfinance.org/docs/biocf-Kenya-SALM-Flyer.pdf.  
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Box 5. Carbon finance potential for an area enclosure within Ethiopia’s PSNP 
As discussed in Box 1, Ethiopia’s PSNP is generating real and quantifiable carbon benefits through 
implementation of CSA practices. Given the high interest in AFOLU projects the question arises, what are 
plausible revenue streams that PSNP could generate? Using the example of the CSI site in the Asore 
watershed, Alaba Special Woreda, SNNPR—a model site with well-established (20-year old) natural and 
assisted woodland regeneration—a carbon benefit of 12.1 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1 was predicted using an IPCC 
Tier 2 assessment; a more rigorous dynamic (Tier 3) modelling approach predicted a more conservative 
net carbon benefit of 7.8 tCO2e ha-1 yr-1  for soil and biomass carbon, although this approach does not 
account for livestock impacts (see Woolf et al. 2015 for details). 
 
Figure 18. Asore watershed, Alaba Special Woreda, SNNPR IPCC Tier 2 assessment of carbon benefits by GHG flux category. See 
Woolf et al. 2015 for details. 
Market analyses show that buyers in voluntary markets historically pay about US$9 per tCO2e for 
afforestation/reforestation (A/R) projects (Peters-Stanley, Goldstein, and Gonzalez 2014), a likely AFOLU 
categorization for the Asore site. Using this price and the dynamic model net carbon benefit, a 
theoretical sum exceeding US$43,000 annually could possibly be generated for a 616 ha site analogous 
to that under PSNP implementation at Asore. However, note that if this project were transitioned to a 
more diverse agroforestry system, potential revenues could increase by a factor of up to 1.8: buyers of 
agroforestry projects paid over US$16 per tCO2e for diversified agroforestry projects (Peters-Stanley, 
Goldstein, and Gonzalez 2014).  
N.b., these estimates represent potential gross revenues: it is important to note that this must be offset 
against the numerous cost categories for project development, implementation, monitoring and 
verification that result in substantially lower overall net revenues. Nonetheless, the ‘take-home’ 
message is that the carbon benefits generated by CSA practices deployed through public works safety 
net programs such as Ethiopia’s PSNP are i) quantifiable through a combination of field assessments and 
rigorous modeling exercises, and ii) that these quantified values can be used to develop carbon projects 
for sale of carbon credits in compliance or voluntary markets. 
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7.2 Grouped projects approach in carbon markets 
Recognizing the failure of the CDM to enable smaller scale projects in least developed countries 
access to CDM markets, the UNFCCC developed the Programme of Activities (PoA) approach in 
recent years. PoAs enable the bundling of many smaller projects under a single administrative 
umbrella organization thereby reducing the administrative burden on MRV as well as lowering 
costs associated with project development and validation. To date, there have been 276 PoAs 
registered and another 119 are undergoing validation (UNEP DTU Partnership 2015). Whereas 
less than 3% of non-PoA CDM projects were in Africa, fully 32% of PoAs are in that region (UNEP 
DTU Partnership 2015) suggesting that the PoA approach is at least alleviating the regional 
biases under the CDM. 
Voluntary markets, including most prominently VCS, have also moved to allow bundling of 
diverse activities under the umbrella of one project. Similar to the CDM PoA, the VCS Grouped 
Projects approach was developed with the aim of lowering the administrative and financial 
burden involved in developing carbon projects, particularly for small-scale projects in the 
developing world. Under this approach, once a grouped project has successfully passed through 
the validation/verification process and been registered, individual project activity instances—
termed Component Project Activities (CPAs) under the CDM—are allowed to come online 
without needing to complete the entire project life cycle de novo.  
The key requirements for grouped projects in the AFOLU sector, as defined in the VCS Standard, 
Version 3.0 (Verified Carbon Standard 2011) are as follows:   
a) the geographic area must be clearly defined using geodetic polygons; 
b) the BAU scenario and additionality are demonstrated based upon the initial project 
activity instances reviewed at validation;  
c) apply AFOLU non-permanence risk analyses that demonstrate that risks are relevant to 
the entire geographic area in order to determine a single total risk rating;  
d) additional project activity instances must adhere to the conditions of the methodology 
applied to the project, have characteristics with respect to additionality that are 
Carbon markets have moved to allow 
grouping of diverse activities under the 
umbrella of one project with the aim of 
lowering the administrative and financial 
burden involved in developing carbon 
projects, particularly for small-scale 
projects in the developing world. 
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consistent with the initial instances, and are subject to the same BAU scenario as 
specified in the Project Description; and  
e) leakage from shifts in activity outside of the geographic area or market leakage must be 
assessed according to the methodology applied to the project for the initial instances as 
well as all new instances.  
While multiple methodologies are permitted under grouped projects, in practice this is difficult 
for two reasons: 1) it is not permitted to overlap methodologies on the same geographic area, 
be it the field, farm, or forest, i.e., if multiple methodologies are used they can only be applied 
to distinct geographic parcels within the grouped project and 2) the level of complexity of a 
project increases greatly as methodologies are added because additionality, BAU scenarios and 
other requirements must be separately demonstrated for each methodology (Carolyn Ching 
2015).  
7.2.1 Status of grouped projects approach for AFOLU 
As of March 2015, only two PoAs in the AFOLU sector have been submitted for validation to the 
CDM in Africa (both afforestation projects in Senegal and Mozambique) and five grouped 
projects were registered in the VCS Project Database15. One reason for this paucity of grouped 
projects, is that this approach only emerged in the last several years so project developers have 
yet to take advantage of it in great numbers. There is, however, greater scrutiny placed on 
grouped projects during the validation phase which may pose an additional barrier to entry 
(Carolyn Ching 2015). 
7.2.2 Grouped projects approach and PSNP 
The highly integrated nature of sustainable land management activities across PSNP project 
sites means that SSRs overlap. Further, changes in SSRs due to sustainable land management 
are often synergistically linked e.g., reforestation in an enclosure leads to carbon accrual in 
woody biomass but also increases in soil carbon stocks. Thus, the requirement that only one 
methodology be applied for each distinct geographic area (outlined in Section 7.2) means that 
certain SSRs would be excluded. For example, if an A/R methodology was selected, then only 
woody biomass accrual would be allowed at the expense of the potentially quantifiable benefit 
from soil carbon accumulation. Fortunately, there is at least one VCS methodology published—
VM0017 Adoption of Sustainable Agricultural Land Management, v1.0—that enables 
quantification of all SSRs impacted by PSNP 4.  
                                                     
15 The VCS Project Database is accessible at 
http://www.vcsprojectdatabase.org/#/homehttp://www.vcsprojectdatabase.org/#/home.  
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The geographic boundary of the grouped project under PSNP 4 could in theory be set to the 
level of a regional state, or even the entire country. However, this would be difficult at a large 
scale given the diversity of ecological, economic and social conditions in such an area; the 
evidence presented for baseline scenario and additionality in the initial project instances would 
likely not be applicable to subsequent project instances in different regions. It is therefore 
advisable to set the geographic boundary to a smaller unit e.g., agro-ecological zone, livelihood 
zone, geographic watershed, or woreda, that encompasses similar sets of parameters as those 
used to set the baseline and demonstrate additionality.  
Under PSNP 4, a grouped project could encompass a mosaic of sustainable land management 
activities within such an extensive project boundary. An approved methodology e.g., VM0017, 
should be selected that permits the quantification of GHG benefits via reforestation, 
agroforestry, crop rotations, improved residue and fertilizer management, physical soil and 
water conservation measures, and/or other sustainable land management practices. Since 
implementing project activities across such a large area all at once would likely be difficult, 
project activity instances could be added by watersheds or kebeles, as resources are made 
available and as PSNP 4 progresses during its 2015 – 20 timeframe.  
7.3 Standardized methods in carbon markets 
While the grouped projects approach already in place under the CDM and VCS is worth 
exploring for potential development of (a subset of) PSNP 4 activities into carbon markets as 
described above (see Section 7.2), a newer approach is potentially more attractive. Namely, the 
development and use of standardized methods which are designed to streamline the process of 
demonstrating additionality and/or identifying the BAU scenario. Both the CDM and VCS have 
implemented mechanisms to develop standardized methods (in the CDM they are referred to 
as standardized baselines but are functionally equivalent).  
Rather than working on a project-by-project basis, standardized methods define conditions and 
criteria for demonstrating BAU scenarios and/or additionality relative to an entire class of 
project activity—usually within a certain GHG emitting sector and region. Individual projects 
Under PSNP 4, a grouped project could 
encompass a mosaic of SLM activities within 
an extensive project boundary. GHG 
benefits could be quantified for PSNP 
practices and project activity instances 
could be added by watersheds or kebeles, 
as resources are made available. 
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then need only meet these conditions and criteria that have been pre-determined in the 
standardized method.  
In addition to the efficiencies of this approach, it also allows for the BAU scenario and 
additionality to be set across entire jurisdictions. For example, the first standardized method 
developed and currently under review at VCS is for reduced impact logging activities in East 
Kalimantan, Indonesia—an area considerably larger than SNNPR, Ethiopia. Hence, entire 
landscapes measuring millions of hectares are theoretically targets for development of carbon 
projects. This is in contrast to the current status where small land areas on the scale of 
hundreds to thousands of hectares typify non-REDD+ AFOLU projects.  
7.3.1 Performance- versus activity-based standardized methods  
The CDM and VCS allow for two types of standardized methods: performance methods and 
activity methods. In a performance method, benchmarks metrics are established for 
determining additionality and/or the BAU scenario. An additionality threshold of the metric is 
then set such that any project that meets or exceeds that threshold is deemed additional. For 
example, a standardized method for A/R in an Ethiopian regional state would need to collect 
data showing the extent of current A/R implementation (i.e., the BAU scenario) for parameters 
such as number of hectares reforested, mortality due to natural events/extraction, etc., within 
the State. These data would then be used to calculate average GHG emissions under the BAU 
scenario and also to justify the additionality threshold for eligible projects in that regional state 
e.g., a 15% increase in area reforested, 50% decrease in mortality.  
In an activity method, a positive list of activities is created for a class of project activities, and 
any project that implements activities on the positive list is deemed additional. This approach 
could be simpler than the performance method for AFOLU projects under PSNP. Using the A/R 
example from above, a positive list could include activities such as alley cropping, windbreaks, 
Standardized methods are designed to 
streamline the process of demonstrating 
additionality and/or identifying the BAU 
scenario and are a newer, potentially more 
attractive approach for PSNP. Using 
standardized methods, entire landscapes 
measuring millions of hectares at the scale of 
the regional state in Ethiopia are theoretically 
targets for development of carbon projects. 
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silvopasture, and/or forest farming.  Any of these activities could then be eligible for 
implementation under a carbon project. 
It is imperative to note that development of standardized methods (particularly for 
performance methods in the AFOLU sector) is a data-, time- and resource-intensive process. 
This is necessarily so—the carbon offset programs approving standardized methods require 
sufficient assurances that GHG emissions outlined under BAU scenarios accurately reflect GHG 
fluxes that are then used to justify additionality and acceptance of project activities for carbon 
finance. At VCS, standardized methods undergo a rigorous internal review as well as two 
external assessments by independent, third-party assessors. The minimum realistic time frame 
for approval of standardized methods is on the order of 18 – 36 months.  
Notwithstanding the rigor involved in establishing standardized methods, this is a promising 
approach for PSNP 4. An approved standardized method would allow the inclusion of PSNP 
activities distributed across the landscape at the woreda or even regional level, greatly lowering 
the cost of entry associated with determining the BAU scenario and demonstrating additionality 
for all projects within the standardized method jurisdiction.  
7.3.2 Status of standardized methods for AFOLU in Ethiopia 
To date, there are no standardized methods developed that are applicable to AFOLU in 
Ethiopia. The afore-mentioned VCS standardized method for reduced impact logging in East 
Kalimantan, Indonesia could serve as a template for development of a performance-based 
standardized method for Ethiopian AFOLU projects, though as previously mentioned an activity 
method is likely a more cost-effective approach for PSNP.  
CDM standardized baselines approved (only 9 to date) and under review are dominated by the 
power-generation sector and to a lesser extent charcoal production and landfill gas. There are 
no AFOLU CDM standardized baselines under development. In Ethiopia, the two standardized 
baselines under review are for clinker production in the cement industry and for electrification 
of rural communities.  
8 Additionality in the Ethiopian PSNP context 
Additionality is the central tenet of carbon markets (see Section 4.2.5): without it carbon offset 
projects can neither quantify their climate change mitigation impacts, nor attribute these 
impacts to the availability of climate finance. Climate finance is only applicable to activities that 
are demonstrably additional (see Section 4.2.5). Additionality is therefore rigorously reviewed 
during project validation, and PSNP must carefully analyze the options to demonstrate 
additionality of any of its activities that seek climate finance.  
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First, it is vital to be clear about what type of activities would not be additional. Additionality 
cannot be demonstrated for PSNP projects that have already been completed, or that would 
occur in an ongoing PSNP program of work without carbon finance. 
However, there are three options that PSNP managers could pursue to demonstrate 
additionality, and thus potentially qualify for carbon finance:  
i) An expansion of PSNP that would not be possible without carbon finance.  
ii) Improvements in implementation of existing or planned PSNP projects that have 
additional carbon benefits that would not be achieved without carbon finance.  
iii) Securing the continuation of PSNP activities when sites are returned to community 
management after PSNP ends. 
These three options are discussed in the following sections.  
8.1 Expansion of PSNP activities 
Of these possible routes for additionality, option i) is the simplest and also the recommended 
approach for two reasons. Firstly, a shortfall in currently available funding for PSNP means that 
the program will not be fully implemented without further sources of finance (it is estimated 
that there is a shortfall in the order of one billion US$ to fully implement PSNP 4). Therefore, 
additional funding from other sources such as carbon finance would result in additional projects 
that could not otherwise be implemented. Secondly, seeking carbon finance to support 
additional activities that would not be implemented without carbon finance opens the 
possibility to keep development and MRV costs within manageable limits by introducing 
landscape-scale whole watershed management projects in which the carbon projects are 
concentrated into contiguous areas. This is important because in its current state, PSNP 
Additionality cannot be demonstrated for PSNP projects that a) 
have already been implemented, or b) would occur in an 
ongoing PSNP program of work without carbon finance.  
 
However, additionality may be demonstrated for i) an expansion 
of PSNP, ii) improvements in implementation of existing or 
planned PSNP, and iii) securing the continuation of PSNP 
activities when sites are returned to community management 
after PSNP ends. All three of these scenarios must demonstrate 
that they are not possible without carbon finance. 
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operates in a highly dispersed and geographically distant non-contiguous distribution of micro-
watershed projects in diverse agro-ecological zones. Not only would the logistics and costs of 
managing a carbon project on such a dispersed set of sites be unnecessarily high, but it is also 
unlikely that a single methodology could be applied across all sites, because of large differences 
in baseline scenarios across the varied livelihood and agro-ecology. 
8.2 Improvements in PSNP implementation  
Option ii) would involve making changes to the way that PSNP sites are managed that increase 
carbon benefits beyond a BAU scenario in which PSNP activities are implemented according to 
currently prevailing practices. This could include e.g., enhanced measures to preclude livestock 
encroachment into enclosures; replacing forage grasses with forage trees; or increasing the 
amount of annual croplands converted to perennial crops or agroforestry. Although it is to be 
recommended that such measures be increasingly adopted in any case, because they would 
enhance the impact of PSNP, nonetheless using this as an approach to demonstrating 
additionality for carbon finance has some associated difficulties. Firstly, it does nothing to 
alleviate the problem noted above that a highly distributed network of micro-watersheds would 
entail high development and MRV costs for a carbon project. In fact, this issue would be 
exacerbated by the fact that marketing only the increased GHG mitigation of these projects 
relative to a BAU scenario in which these projects already deliver some (albeit lower) GHG 
benefits would entail having lower financeable (additional) carbon benefits per site. This would 
reduce the density per ha of GHG benefits being financed, while doing nothing to alleviate the 
high costs per hectare of a distributed network of projects. 
8.3 Maintenance of climate-smart practices after PSNP wind-down 
Option iii) entails seeking carbon finance to protect the benefits accrued in PSNP sites from a 
return to BAU practices (with commensurate land degradation) after the sites are returned 
from PSNP to community management. This is premised on the assumption that the 
In summary, the most promising approach to achieving 
additionality for PSNP to receive carbon finance would be 
to extend the PSNP program beyond what would 
otherwise be achievable, and to do so using targeted 
landscape-scale projects that minimize carbon project 
development and MRV costs. 
This approach could be further streamlined by use of 
jurisdictional standardized methods. 
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communities will tend to favor pre-PSNP management over the PSNP interventions, either 
because the opportunity costs of PSNP are higher than the benefits they receive from PSNP 
management, or because of a “tragedy of the commons” in which individuals acting 
independently according to each's self-interest behave contrary to the best interests of the 
whole group by depleting the common resource. The difficulties listed above for developing a 
carbon project consisting of highly distributed micro-watersheds and in diverse agro-ecological 
and livelihood zones would apply here also if such an approach were to be applied at the 
national scale. Furthermore, the large diversity of types of site would require that the threat to 
the sites would have to be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis rather than applying a 
common set of baseline assumptions across all PSNP sites.  
Finally, it should also be noted that protecting existing carbon stocks would come under a 
REDD+ methodology, and for REDD+ to apply, lands must qualify as forest for at least 10 years 
prior to the project start date. Together, these constraints make this an unattractive option for 
a national scale approach. Nonetheless, the possibility of garnering some carbon finance for 
works that are already completed was seen as an attractive possibility by a number of regional 
PSNP practitioners, and it might be possible that selected sites that are old enough to qualify 
for REDD+, and which are clearly under threat from local community activities could be 
investigated for their potential as community (rather than PSNP) carbon projects. 
9 Non-market-based mechanisms of climate finance  
Whereas significant research and discussion has been placed on the potential for carbon 
markets to spawn investments in climate change mitigation and adaptation activities in 
developing countries, an analysis of carbon finance trends shows that this has yet to crystallize. 
Not carbon markets, but bi- and multilateral funding agencies continue to be by far the largest 
source of finance for mitigation and adaptation activities. In the period 2010 – 12, annual flows 
of climate finance through public institutions from developed to developing countries was 
between US$35 – 50 billion16 (UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance 2014). This amount 
dwarfs flows through carbon markets by at least an order of magnitude; in 2011, estimates in 
                                                     
16 Private institutions in developed countries channeled an additional US$5 – 125 billion per year (UNFCCC 
Standing Committee on Finance 2014). 
Not carbon markets, but bi- and 
multilateral funding agencies continue 
to be by far the largest source of 
finance for climate change mitigation 
and adaptation activities. 
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revenues from sales of CERs in the CDM range from US$3.5 – 4 billion (Kirkman et al. 2012). 
However, note that since then the market for CERs has dropped precipitously and revenues 
likely followed suit. Voluntary carbon markets are even smaller; in 2011 their market value was 
estimated at US$587 million (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013). Box 6 further explores trends in 
direct climate finance. 
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Box 6. Bi- and multilateral climate finance flows  
 
Since 2003, pledges for climate finance for both adaptation and mitigation activities have come 
overwhelmingly from countries in the global north (Figure 19). The UK, US, Germany and Norway top 
the list of donors with over US$20 billion committed. Other European countries as well as Japan and 
Australia have also made significant contributions. In some cases these funds are made available 
directly via country-to-country transactions (bilaterally) and in others they are channeled through 
multilateral institutions and funds.  
Globally, funds from bi- and multilateral institutions are skewed towards supporting mitigation 
activities, mostly via the 
energy sector (Figure 20). 
The exception to this rule 
is Sub-Saharan Africa 
where nearly half of all 
funds pledged are for 
adaptation activities. 
Nonetheless, funds 
dedicated to mitigation in 
the region are still 
significant; in excess of 
US$1.2 billion since 2006 
(Figure 21). Of this, one 
quarter was in the AFOLU 
sector (forestry and 
agriculture combined). 
Note, however, that all 
forest- related mitigation 
finance to date (US$298 
Figure 19. Approved climate finance by donor source. Note that the size of the bubble represents the relative size of the 
contribution from the donor country (source: Overseas Development Institute 2015). 
Figure 20. Approved climate finance recipients by region and type (source: Overseas 
Development Institute 2015). 
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million) was for REDD+ related activities. When REDD+ finance flows are excluded, the AFOLU sector 
received less than 3% of total SSA mitigation finance (Overseas Development Institute 2015).  
Honing in on Ethiopia, since 2003 the country has received pledges totaling US$180 million as follows: 
US$34 million for adaptation, US$37 million (non-REDD), US$72 million for REDD-related mitigation, 
and US$41 million for cross-cutting themes (Overseas Development Institute 2015). When excluding 
exclusively adaptation-oriented, nearly one-third of Ethiopia’s pledges are for activities in the AFOLU 
sector (Figure 21).  
 
9.1 The Green Climate Fund (GCF): an emerging opportunity for PSNP 
An emerging climate finance instrument with potential to support Ethiopia’s PSNP 4 is the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF), initially conceived in 2009 at COP-15 where a goal of US$100 billion 
of annual funding by 2020 was set. The aim of such a fund was stated as supporting projects, 
programs and policies that advance climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing 
world parties to the UNFCCC. At COP-20 in late 2014 the GCF was formally launched with an 
initial round of financial pledges from industrialized nations totaling nearly US$10.2 billion17. As, 
and if, the fund continues to be capitalized to the level of the COP-15 aspirations, the GCF will 
become a prime source for finance of sustainable land management activities that address 
climate change mitigation and/or adaptation in the developing world.  
The operational framework for the GCF is still being finalized. Nonetheless, some key aspects 
are already developed. Each country will have a National Designated Authority (NDA) 
responsible for nominating sub-national, national, or regional entities from the public or private 
                                                     
17 More information on the GCF can be accessed here http://www.gcfund.org/about/the-fund.html.  
Figure 21. Mitigation funding (in millions USD) approved for disbursement to SSA countries (left) and Ethiopia (right) (source: 
Overseas Development Institute 2015). 
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sectors to become accredited to receive and disburse funding (so-called accredited entities), 
and to ensure that any activities supported via the GCF align with that country’s internal policy 
and development objectives and priorities. The GCF aims for a 50:50 balance between support 
for mitigation and adaptation activities over time (Green Climate Fund 2014).  
GCF highlights six investment criteria used to assess the fit with the fund’s objectives: 1) climate 
impact potential; 2) paradigm shift potential; 3) sustainable development potential; 4) needs of 
the recipient; 5) country ownership; and 6) efficiency and effectiveness. The six criteria are all 
highly compatible with climate smart interventions implemented as part of PSNP. 
 
Figure 22. Operational structure of the Green Climate Find.  
An emerging carbon finance instrument 
with potential to support PSNP 4 is the 
Green Climate Fund. The six investment 
criteria used by GCF are all highly 
compatible with PSNP. 
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9.1.1 The Green Climate Fund and Ethiopia 
Some key elements of GCF operational requirements are already in place in Ethiopia. First, the 
Ministry of Environment and Forest (MEF) is designated as the NDA responsible for nominating 
accredited entities (AEs) to allocate GCF resources for climate change projects. Second, as of 
July 2015 twenty AEs have received accreditation from the GCF.18 Several of the approved AEs 
operate in Ethiopia and have the potential to channel funds to PSNP for additional 
implementation of climate smart activities. In fact, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the International Development Association (together known as the 
World Bank (WB))—a central partner supporting Ethiopia’s PSNP—is one of the newly listed 
AEs. The WB and other AEs are targets for PSNP 4 to seek further allocation of resources.  
Initial funding in the form of “readiness” support began to flow to Ethiopia in July 2015 with a 
GCF award to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) for US$300,000 to 
increase capacity for country ownership—a core principle of the GCF. With the readiness grant 
in place, other agencies within Ethiopia, as well as development partners, are situated to 
develop full project proposals, which GCF announced it will begin to award to applicants at its 
11th meeting scheduled for November 2015 in Zambia.  
It is important to note that the Ethiopian government (GoE) intends to submit a proposal to 
GCF for multi-sectoral support. As such, PSNP administrators should maintain communications 
with GoE officials to ensure that submissions are coordinated and do not jeopardize the ability 
of either GoE or PSNP to garner funds from GCF for reasons of limited allocation of funds per 
country or otherwise.  
9.2 Other funds with potential to support PSNP 
While the GCF represents perhaps the best opportunity for financing additional implementation 
of climate smart interventions through PSNP, there are other established funds that may 
support PSNP or elements thereof. Bilateral funds linked to the international development arms 
                                                     
18 An updated list of AEs can be accessed here http://www.gcfund.org/operations/accreditation/accredited-
entities.html.  
 
While the GCF represents perhaps the best 
opportunity for financing additional 
implementation of climate smart agricultural 
practices through PSNP, there are other 
established funds that may support PSNP or 
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of industrialized nations such as the EU countries, Norway, USA, Canada, Australia and Japan all 
support climate change mitigation activities to varying degrees, and indeed have approved 
projects to this end within Ethiopia, including PSNP, of course. Outreach to government 
embassies of Ethiopia’s development partners to discuss potential fit of PSNP 4 with bilateral 
funding sources is advised. Multilateral funds operated under the purview of UN or WB 
agencies may also represent funding opportunities for PSNP 4. These are discussed in the 
following sections.  
9.2.1 WB BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes  
The World Bank BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes (ISFL) became 
operational in November 2013 and has received US$380 million in commitments from four 
donor nations (Germany, Norway, UK, and USA)19. The aim of the ISFL is to support countries to 
adopt and promote climate smart agriculture and sustainable land use policies and practices, 
particularly in the forestry sector, in order to reduce GHG emissions from the AFOLU sector.  
ISFL will operate at the jurisdictional (sub-national) level and aims to comprehensively 
implement policies and programs across the entire jurisdiction, rather than isolated project-
level interventions. ISFL pledges of up to US$50 million will be made for results-based finance 
(payments for verified emissions reductions from implementation of programmatic 
interventions) and smaller pledges of around US$10 million for technical assistance. At current 
levels of ISFL capitalization, an initial tranche of 4 – 5 jurisdictional programs is anticipated. 
In 2014, Ethiopia became the first country to receive a pledge of up to US$50 million through 
the ISFL for support of the Oromia Forested Landscape Carbon Finance Program (aka Oromia 
REDD+ Program). A small percentage of that grant will be paid in advance to develop the 
framework for program development and execution (Danyo 2014). 
9.2.2 WB Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
The WB Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is a program designed to support and develop 
REDD+ initiatives in developing countries (FCPF 2015)20. Two FCPF funding mechanisms have 
been set up to achieve this goal: first, the Readiness Fund to help countries design and 
implement the policies and institutions to track and monitor GHG from the forest sector, and, 
second, the Carbon Fund which will make results-based payments for verified emissions 
reductions. At current levels of capitalization the Carbon Fund only anticipates 5 countries will 
be supported for results-based REDD+ payments. 
To date, 24 developing countries have received REDD+ Readiness grants, Ethiopia among them. 
Readiness activities include “adopting national REDD+ strategies; developing reference 
emission levels (RELs); designing measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems; and 
setting up REDD+ national management arrangements, including proper environmental and 
                                                     
19 More information on the ISFL can be accessed here http://www.biocarbonfund-isfl.org/.  
20 More information on the FCPF can be accessed here https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/. 
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social safeguards,” all of which entails a high degree of consultation with local communities, 
civil society organizations and indigenous peoples organizations. 
9.2.3 Global Environment Facility 
The UN Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established in 1991 as a partnership for 
international cooperation to support environmental sustainable development. To date, over 
183 countries have participated, contributing funds and/or hosting projects, and US$13.5B in 
grants has been disbursed in 165 developing countries. The GEF manages three funds21 relevant 
to climate change mitigation that may potentially support sustainable land management 
activities. 
The process to apply for all GEF funds begins with outreach to the country-designated GEF 
Operational Focal Point22 to determine fit with programmatic criteria and host country 
priorities. Once preparatory steps are finalized with the Focal Point, the project proponent 
develops a Project Identification Form which is reviewed by the GEF Secretariat for approval. 
In addition to climate change mitigation, PSNP activities improve resilience and adaptation to 
climate change at the community level and therefore may fit within the GEF Trust Fund, SCCF 
and LDCF funding criteria. However, communications with the Ethiopian Focal Point are advised 
to determine availability of funding and programmatic fit before embarking on any proposal 
development.  
9.2.4 Global Climate Change Alliance  
The EU Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) was established in 2007 to promote dialogue 
and cooperation on climate change in developing countries23. The GCCA budget is presently 
more than US$335M. Ethiopia has received one grant from the GCCA for institutional capacity 
building around climate change resilience. A new phase of the GCCA from the 2014-2020 period 
is currently being implemented and includes a large focus on technical support for REDD and 
enhanced participation in mitigation efforts, among others. PSNP activities likely fall into one or 
more of the GCCA focal areas and scoping of funding opportunities is thus recommended.  
9.2.5 Sustainable Development Goals Fund 
The Sustainable Development Goals Fund (SDGF) was established by UNDP in 201424. It is the 
successor fund to the Millennium Development Goals Fund (MDGF) also operated by UNDP. 
SDGF presently funds projects in 18 countries including one in Ethiopia. Focal areas include 
poverty eradication, water and sanitation, food security and nutrition. The latter focal area may 
                                                     
21 More information on the GEF can be accessed here https://www.thegef.org/gef/home.  
22 In Ethiopia the Focal Point is housed within the Ministry of Environment and Forest. Further information on the 
current Focal Point including contact information can be accessed here 
https://www.thegef.org/gef/focal_points_list/E.  
23 More information on the GCCA can be accessed here http://www.gcca.eu/.  
24 More information on the SDGF can be accessed here http://www.sdgfund.org/.  
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fit with PSNP activities. However, to date only US$45M have been allocated to the SDGF and 
therefore any support to PSNP would likely be relatively modest. 
9.3 Adaptation finance 
By their very nature, activities that enhance climate change mitigation also often contribute to 
adaptation and resilience. For example, planting agroforestry tree species in area enclosures 
leads to carbon sequestration in biomass and soils (mitigation) but also stabilization of erodible 
slopes, diversification of dietary needs, and new income opportunities for communities 
(adaptation). For this reason, the funding opportunities previously discussed in Section 9 as 
applicable to PSNP, while chiefly targeting mitigation, do often list adaptation as desired co-
benefits.  
Nonetheless, funds and initiatives dedicated primarily to climate change adaptation are 
numerous. Given their breadth and the scope of this report, however, they are not further 
discussed. The website Climate Funds Update—jointly operated by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung 
North America and the Overseas Development Institute—maintains an up-to-date database of 
funds focused on adaptation (and mitigation) which can be accessed here 
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/themes/adaptation.  
10 Conclusion and Recommendations  
Access to sufficient food in food-insecure regions will continue to be a global concern in the 
coming decades. This is especially true in SSA where the population is projected to increase 
four-fold by the end of this century. Some social safety net programs—designed to alleviate 
food insecurity—utilize public works as a means to build critical infrastructure such as irrigation 
works, farmland improvements and others which can enhance agricultural outcomes and 
deliver additional social and environmental goods. In parallel, such climate smart public works 
also create carbon benefits through replenishment of soil carbon stocks, sequestration of 
carbon in biomass, and reductions in GHGs associated with the AFOLU sector. Public works 
social safety nets that institute sustainable land management practices could utilize existing 
frameworks of carbon accounting to quantify the carbon benefits of their programs and to then 
seek out opportunities for financing of climate change mitigation. In addition to income from 
international development aid and host country governments, climate finance can serve as an 
important source of revenue to sustain and scale-up public works safety nets—ultimately 
furthering common goals of enhanced food security and livelihoods, improved natural resource 
management and climate change mitigation. 
Ethiopia’s PSNP—a model public works safety net program that creates multiple social, 
economic, and environmental benefits through climate smart interventions—is a case in point. 
Using a combination of geospatial techniques, field-based analytical methods and modelling, 
the climate change mitigation benefits of the program can be quantified on a subset of PSNP 
sites through the CSI. These carbon benefits can be used by PSNP administrators to pursue 
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climate finance opportunities—whether from bi- and multilateral donor institutions seeking to 
support climate smart sustainable development priorities or public/private sector entities 
looking to purchase carbon credits through compliance or voluntary carbon markets. Indeed, 
data generated by CSI has already been used to secure support for PSNP 4 from bilateral 
donors. 
Public works safety net programs that institute sustainable land management practices should 
embed methodologies to quantify the net carbon benefits that they generate. In addition to 
income from international development aid as well as host countries, climate finance can serve 
as an important source of revenue to sustain and scale-up public works safety nets.  
10.1 Recommendations for climate financing of Ethiopia’s PSNP 
Looking forward, there are several important messages regarding the potential for climate 
finance to support Ethiopia’s PSNP: 
1) Carbon offset markets are not currently in a state to allow for ambitious proposals 
(although note that non-market mechanisms of climate finance are in a more robust state). 
The single largest compliance market that allows for international offset projects in the 
AFOLU sector—the UNFCCC CDM—is winding down in the Kyoto Protocol CP2. Voluntary 
markets, while more positive in their market outlook, remain small relative to Ethiopia’s 
PSNP climate change mitigation potential and would likely only provide revenues for 
projects covering a small fraction of its land area. 
2) Nonetheless, there are encouraging signs within the ongoing UNFCCC climate negotiations 
that i) binding international commitments to reduce GHG emissions will be reached at COP-
21 in Paris at the end of 2015, and ii) that carbon offset markets will likely be one of the 
mechanisms made available for countries to meet their reduction obligations. Strong 
climate policy commitments have historically also been linked to growth and participation 
in voluntary carbon markets, and a successful COP-21 may therefore also bolster offsetting 
in the voluntary space by growing demand for carbon credits.  
3) If carbon markets do grow substantially in the near future—as they must if climate change 
is to be kept within safe limits, and as seems probable given the growing pressure to reach a 
new global accord at COP-21 in Paris 2015—then Ethiopia should act now to insure that it is 
well-positioned to take advantage of market opportunities as they arise. It is, therefore, 
recommended that a modest carbon market project be developed for Ethiopia’s PSNP. 
Using a grouped projects (VCS) or Programme of Activities (CDM) approach, such a project 
could encompass a mosaic of sustainable watershed management activities within an 
extensive project boundary; for example, covering up to four woredas across the PSNP 
regions and totaling thousands to tens of thousands of hectares. Such a project could have a 
market value of US$15-20 million over 20-30 years making it an ambitious and worthwhile 
initiative.  
4) When planning a carbon project, site selection is critical. The highest carbon sequestration 
potential per hectare is in the wetter and more fertile regions, whereas food security issues 
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are more pervasive in the drier regions. The low hanging fruit will be to develop projects 
that generate the highest benefit to cost ratio in terms of carbon sequestration potential 
per unit area. However, the drier regions also stand to benefit greatly from the food 
security and ecosystem rehabilitation improvements that carbon projects offer. Therefore, 
there are strong rationales for initiating and incubating pilot projects in both more humid 
and in dryer regions, to build the in-country capacity for carbon finance across varying 
agroecological zones that will be key to contributing to Ethiopia’s overall climate-smart 
development goals.  
5) Carbon projects developed for this purpose in the near future must be sized to be 
compatible with the current volumes of transactions in carbon markets. It is not realistic to 
attempt to finance a project on the scale of the whole of PSNP through carbon markets at 
the present time. However, capacity built during pilot projects will position Ethiopia to act 
rapidly as and when the carbon finance outlook improves. A transition to national scale 
AFOLU carbon projects must wait until markets develop. 
6) To insure compliance with the additionality requirement of climate finance, any carbon 
project seeking climate finance should be a demonstrably new project that was not already 
planned or financed by PSNP. As such, it should represent an opportunity to expand PSNP 
beyond what is possible with current funding constraints. 
7) Project costs have historically often been comparable, or sometimes greater, than the funds 
accessed through climate finance. Therefore keeping project costs as low as possible, while 
maintaining the rigor demanded of climate finance mechanisms, must be a high priority. In 
this regard, it is highly recommended that carbon projects be developed only in large 
contiguous areas, rather than comprised of multiple bundled small projects that are 
geographically dispersed. It is also recommended that low-cost and streamlined methods 
for land-management data collection, remote-sensing analysis of biomass, and mid-infrared 
soil analysis that have been piloted within CSI be utilized for planning, monitoring and 
verification purposes. 
8) To lay the foundation for larger jurisdictional carbon projects, Ethiopia’s PSNP should 
pursue development of standardized methods in VCS or other relevant markets to quantify 
carbon benefits across much larger land areas more applicable to the scope of PSNP. These 
jurisdictional approaches should best be based on agroecological and livelihood zones to 
facilitate GHG accounting across reasonably homogeneous climatic, ecological, and socio-
cultural regions; for example, the dry highlands of Tigray and Amhara, and the relatively 
wetter highlands of Oromia and SNNPR. The semi-arid and arid lowland regions of Ethiopia, 
although they are chronically vulnerable and their resilience to climate change can benefit 
from improved land management and rehabilitation, they are more challenging 
environments to establish carbon projects in the near future. Further research should be 
undertaken to establish the best climate smart practices with proven carbon benefits that 
are socio-economically viable at scale in these regions.  
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In the first instance, to keep costs manageable and commensurate with the size of current 
carbon markets, it is recommended that standardized methods be piloted in only one or a 
few pilot woredas. This approach is well-aligned with current CRGE unit of the MoA’s 
programmatic agenda, which includes method development in 52 fast-track woredas. 
Institutional support for climate finance of PSNP should be best placed within the CRGE unit 
of the MoA because of their already existing expertise, infrastructure, and their cross-
cutting remit with regard to climate change.  
9) The Oromia Forested Landscape Program (OFLP) is a REDD+ pilot project that is breaking 
new ground to develop jurisdictional approaches that will be relevant primarily to large-
scale forest ecosystems. Although some PSNP activities (i.e., area enclosures focused on 
forest regeneration within Oromia) could benefit from OFLP’s outputs, there are strong 
rationales to pursue additional climate finance avenues within the wider PSNP context: 
a. For PSNP’s diverse suite of climate smart land management practices on agricultural 
lands (including cropland improvements, agroforestry and sustainable forage 
production), Oromia is too large a scale, given the current complexities of developing 
GHG accounting methodologies for smallholder agricultural systems. 
b. OFLP is a much-needed effort, but it will probably take several years to establish the 
required methodologies before GHG-reducing activities can commence and mitigation 
finance begins to flow. But, PSNP and the government of Ethiopia (GoE) can benefit 
from gaining experience now by developing smaller scale project(s) using established 
methodologies and market channels in addition to developing standardized methods 
specifically tailored to PSNP’s diverse suite of climate smart land management practices. 
c. The unique aspect of PSNP is that it opens a novel opportunity for food-security 
interventions to be a vehicle for climate change mitigation. The clear opportunity to 
access new funding from carbon markets and multi- or bilateral sources is compelling, 
not only for PSNP but other safety nets and food security programs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and beyond. In this regard, PSNP could be a trailblazer by providing valuable 
lessons learned in the coming years to facilitate future scaling-up of land-based climate 
change mitigation efforts that are coupled with food security interventions. It could also 
provide an opportunity to enhance the long-term endurance and sustainability of such 
systems even beyond the life time of the food security program. 
10) A proposal should be developed and submitted to the development partners to support 
creation of a task team within the CRGE unit under the umbrella of the MoA for climate 
finance of PSNP. CSI consortium partners can provide advisory support if required to help 
with establishment of such a task team. 
11) Notwithstanding the potential of carbon offset programs to support PSNP, direct income 
from bi- and multilateral donors in the form of grants and loans remains the mainstay of 
climate finance opportunities at present. Indeed, Ethiopia’s PSNP and its climate smart 
public works interventions are largely supported through such financing channels. 
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12) The GCF is an attractive emerging multilateral climate fund for Ethiopia’s PSNP public works 
based on its fit with GCF’s six top-level investment criteria, not least of which is a project’s 
climate change mitigation and adaptation potential. To avoid jeopardizing or conflicting 
with potential submissions to GCF from the government of Ethiopia (GoE) for a larger multi-
sectoral proposal, there should be communication between PSNP administrators and the 
GoE when preparing proposals for submission to GCF. With US$10.2 billion committed 
globally as of August 2015, any application to the GCF in the near future must be of a scale 
that is compatible with the total funds that would constitute Ethiopia’s share of the fund. 
Clarification should be sought from the GCF, via the national designated authority (NDA), 
the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MEF), as to how much Ethiopia might be 
allocated. The size of a carbon project submitted to GCF will depend on the size of this 
potential resource, together with a high level (multi-sectoral) decision process of how 
projects should be best distributed amongst the various sectors of Ethiopia’s economy. It is 
recommended that such a decision process involve input from and 
collaboration/coordination with the national CRGE unit. 
13) The potential for demonstrated mitigation benefits of Ethiopia’s PSNP to be used in support 
of negotiations for development funding should not be overlooked. This is known as results-
based finance and is increasingly used by international donors to justify expenditures for 
climate change mitigation. For example, the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) has already used results on PSNP’s net carbon benefits generated by the Cornell CSI 
group to support the business case for release of funds from the UK International Climate 
Fund (ICF) to further support Ethiopia’s PSNP.   
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